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## THESIS

### PEACE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA: RULE OR EXCEPTION?

by

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December, 1997

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**PEACE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA: RULE OR EXCEPTION?**

Viktor A. Gavrilo  
Colonel, Russian Army

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## ABSTRACT

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The operations also demonstrate that with the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States have been able to cooperate in a new fashion, widening the potential scope for peacekeeping in the future. The key prerequisite for success in Bosnia (and for the future) is the willingness of the peacekeeping partners to compromise on their near-term interests and principles, and focus on the long-term benefits of peace and cooperation.





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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia - Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), or collectively (IFOR/SFOR) - exemplify the new opportunities, and prerequisites, for multinational peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. These operations have shown that regional organizations and the UN can complement rather than complicate each other's work. The operations also demonstrate that with the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States have been able to cooperate in a new fashion, widening the potential scope for peacekeeping in the future. The key prerequisite for success in Bosnia (and for the future) is the willingness of the peacekeeping partners to compromise on their near-term interests, and focus on the long-term benefits of peace and cooperation.

IFOR's achievements were significant. It separated the opposing forces, supervised exchanges of territory, enforced the cease fire, demobilized armies and heavy weapons and created a secure environment for political and economic recovery. The stabilization force continues these missions.

IFOR/SFOR also is important because it constitutes the first case of cooperation between the Russian and US military. Russia and NATO demonstrated considerable flexibility and compromise while the coalition was forming, particularly in chain of command issues. Close cooperation between the Russian and US politicians and military was one of the crucial preconditions of success in Bosnia.

IFOR/SFOR might be considered as a model of future peace operations. They should not replace traditional UN peacekeeping activities, but complement those activities where it is necessary to go beyond traditional peacekeeping. The IFOR/SFOR model suggests that in order to achieve the necessary cooperation by participants in the operation, they will have to adjust their assessments of their national interests, and (in some cases) compromise on principles. In any case, the Bosnian experience has facilitated mutual understanding between Russia and the United States, and laid a solid basis for future cooperation.



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## INTRODUCTION

While Peace Operations (POs) help maintain global and regional security and stability, they have always been a function of concrete national interests. With the end of the Cold War, the nature and scope of POs have changed dramatically. Now that the ideological rivalry that ruled the US and Russian national interests in the past has gone, POs are in the process of reforming and acquiring new purposes, and are subject to new constraints. However, a general analysis of past POs shows that international organizations were able to effectively engage and manage conflicts when there was a consent on crucial questions based on combinations of national interests, and, more specifically, when there was a will of one of the superpowers “to swallow its principles”.<sup>1</sup>

*New trends in peace operations.* Recent developments have revealed that traditional UN peacekeeping was not always an adequate response to some contingencies, although it showed limited effectiveness in many cases.<sup>2</sup> On several occasions, the

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<sup>1</sup> This precondition was articulated and proved by Ernst Haas in his outstanding research of more than 300 conflicts. - See Haas, Ernst B. *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1986, p. 39. - Since then the world has changed greatly, it is becoming multipolar and more complex with a greater number of various interactions that will require a lot of compromise between different poles of the world.

<sup>2</sup> It is quite clear, that the ultimate criterion of effectiveness is a full-scale settlement of a conflict. However, it is not always practically achievable, that is why the UN Mandate may include different tasks: control a cease of fire; abate a situation; isolate a conflict. These tasks implementation may be assessed using different criteria of effectiveness. For example, according to Ernst Haas's study of 319 conflicts in 1945-1984, the UN peacekeeping had showed a substantial, although limited success in terms of isolation and abatement. However, fewer and fewer of the more serious disputes were referred to the UN and regional organizations for management, particularly since late 1970s. That is why Haas concluded in general that there was a decline in effectiveness for the United Nations and the regional organizations. - See Haas, Ernst B. *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*.

Security Council has authorized Member States to use ‘all necessary means’ - including force - to deal with armed conflict or threats to peace. Acting with such authorization, Member States formed military coalitions in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997, the Council authorized similar action by a ‘coalition of the willing’ to deal with the situation in Albania. However, none of these enforcement operations were under UN control, but were instead directed by a single country or a group of countries. Not all of these operations were successful.

In recent years UN peacekeeping activity has greatly enlarged compared with traditional peacekeeping activities of 1945-85. In the last ten years the UN has conducted more operations than in the preceding forty years. This enlargement has been not only quantitative, but qualitative. Modern UN POs are aimed at performing new tasks, and often go far beyond traditional peacekeeping. They may include different types of *humanitarian interventions* (delivery of provisions and cargoes, relief to victims of hostilities and refugees), imposing and conducting of *embargo*, *demining*, *restraining* and *disarming* warring parties. Many UN POs also include various civil functions: elections and human rights monitoring, humanitarian assistance, administrative management, and the rebuilding of administrative systems and infrastructure.

*Why Bosnia is a good example?* The POs in Bosnia - the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) - is a good example of post-Cold War efforts to resolve serious conflicts. They show the limits and

capabilities of the world community, and the role of regional alliances in international conflict management. They also represent one of the most interesting cases of so called ‘second generation operations’. First, they have shown that regional organizations and the UN can complement rather than complicate each other’s work. Second, IFOR/SFOR has been coalitional operation that represented common interests (settlement of a conflict that was jeopardizing European peace and security) even though it required one of the coalition members (Russia) to ‘swallow its principles’<sup>3</sup>. Third, it has involved the joint efforts of the prior Cold War enemies -- the US and Russia<sup>4</sup>, and showed the new level of US and Russia’s cooperation in peace support. Fourth, to date it has been the most successful and the least bloody peace operation despite being conducted under a mandate providing for the use of full-scale force measures to fulfill the achieved agreements.

One of the purposes of this thesis is to understand why UNPROFOR failed and IFOR/SFOR succeeded to stop hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. Another purpose is to analyze whether the NATO-led PO in Bosnia is a model that can be applied to future conflict management, or an exception that reflects a unique combination of circumstances.

This problem is important now, because the international community has acquired new and more effective means to prevent crises and settle conflicts. New conditions also

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<sup>3</sup> Russia’s principles include its historically determined orientation to the Serbs, while considering the Balkans as one of Russia’s traditional spheres of influence. Now this influence has obviously substantially diminished. At the same time participation of Russian troops in the Bosnian operation has allowed Russia to preserve some influence in this region and to some extent guarantee its historical ties with the Serbs.

<sup>4</sup> Here Russia means the USSR that actually was the US enemy.

exist for Russia and the US to cooperate in promoting global peace and security, including enhanced military cooperation. The peace operation in Bosnia is an example of effectively coordinated efforts provided by multinational combined capabilities.

The Bosnian case and UNPROFOR example illustrate that peacekeepers cannot do their job if there is no peace to keep. It also shows that urgent intervention is sometimes necessary at the very height of conflict, even if only to prevent hostilities from spreading. However, there must be created or exist certain preconditions for such operation to be successful.

The IFOR/SFOR example shows, how these preconditions were created. The decision to intervene was well prepared, and general consensus of all powers was achieved. The employment of effective mixed strategy resulted in the warring parties' consent to more robust force deployment. The conflict had come to a stalemate, and the parties understood their inability to solve it by military force. A clear military strategy was developed, and public support was gained. In short, the appropriate insertion of a regional task force at the right time to ensure the cease-fire was held and a stable environment was created for the post conflict peace building phase. At the same time, the PO in Bosnia still has not addressed the problems underlying the conflict, which makes the operational success a temporary one, and requires the presence of some foreign peacekeepers, international organizations, and aid workers.

The Bosnian experience has revealed two important issues. First is that Russia can and should contribute to maintaining global and regional peace and stability. Second is that Russia can and should cooperate with US and NATO in all global and regional issues.



Some people say that Russia ‘betrayed’ its national interests in Bosnia. However, it were not national interests, but some principles that were eventually “swallowed” and modified for the sake of peace in the Balkans.<sup>5</sup>

IFOR/SFOR might be considered as a model of future peace operations. They should not replace traditional UN peacekeeping activities, but complement it where it is necessary to go beyond traditional peacekeeping. The IFOR/SFOR model suggests that in order to achieve the necessary cooperation by participants in the operation, they will have to adjust their assessments of their national interests, and (in some cases) compromise on principles. In any case, the Bosnian experience has facilitated mutual understanding between Russia and the United States, and laid a solid basis for future cooperation in the future.

This thesis consists of six chapters and general conclusions. Chapter I deals with a historical review and new developments in Peace Operations in the post-Cold War era. Chapter II, gives some theoretical provisions and hypotheses. Chapter III analyzes history of and international response to Yugoslav crisis. Chapter IV explores UNPROFOR’s failures and achievements. Chapter V gives assessment of IFOR/SFOR. Chapter VI deals with comparative analysis of the POs in Bosnia and the lessons learned.

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<sup>5</sup> There is a great difference between national interests and principles. While national interests are objectively existing national goals, principles are these goals, understood subjectively. History shows that these two categories are very often confused in real politics and policy, when principles are taken for interests and vice versa. Probably, this confusion of principles and interests led to WW I - actually there were more of principles than interests involved in Serbia then. Russia now is not a superpower in terms of the former USSR, however, the past historical memories and its present geopolitical weight still do not make it easy for that country to swallow its principles, and extremely agitate the Russian public opinion.



## **I. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS**

The end of the Cold War provides a sharp dividing line between two periods in the UN peacekeeping history: 1945-1988 and 1989-present. Before that there have been 13 UN peacekeeping operations. Thirty peacekeeping operations were created by the Security Council between 1988 and 1997. There currently 17 POs underway, involving some 23,000 peacekeepers.<sup>6</sup>

As the result of such a heavy involvement in world affairs, the UN has been carried away by a peacekeeping euphoria, while becoming more and more overstretched by new and rather difficult missions.

### ***A. PEACE OPERATIONS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW***

#### **1. Traditional Peacekeeping**

During 1945-1985 there were three broad categories of the UN military tasks<sup>7</sup>:

- observer missions;
- peacekeeping missions; and
- enforcement measures designed to restrain an identified aggressor.

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<sup>6</sup> See *United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance*. UN DPI, May 1997.

<sup>7</sup> Haas, Ernst B. *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1986; Zacher, Mark W. *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77*. NY: Praeger, 1979; Finlayson, Jock A., Zacher, Mark W. "The United Nations and Collective Security", in: *The United States, the United Nations and the Management of Global Change*, ed. by Tobi Trister Gati. NY: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. 162-183; Mackinlay, John. *Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping*. In: *Military Implications Of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Ed. by William H. Lewis. National Defense University. The Institute For National Strategic Studies: Mcnair Paper, 1993. Pp. 25-28.

The last happened, for example, during the Korean War. Military enforcement also occurred during the Congo operation, as an unplanned outgrowth of a peacekeeping mission. The UN forces achieved a complete victory and the defeated party lacked sovereign status.

In general, in 1945-1985 the UN had maintained a significant role and authority in conflict settlement compared to rather low impacts of regional organizations. During the period of 1945-1985 the UN had showed substantial success in abating and isolating disputes, and limited effectiveness in achieving full-scale settlement.

When conditions relating to leadership, consensus, alignment and issue salience were in congruence, successful peacekeeping could take place even if the procedures for organizing, staffing and paying for the operation remained fluid. A peacekeeping operation was normally regarded as a success if it could create conditions of stability and trust to facilitate eventual settlement. The cases of attempted enforcement suggest that action outside the UN framework was crucial to success. Permanent settlement came about when the superpowers, through unilateral means, put pressure on the stronger party to give way. Neutrality was not always required for success. Moreover, UN military operations were most often successful when they favored one side in a dispute.<sup>8</sup>

In general, international organizations' efficiency depended on the presence of a sufficient consensus about combination of national interests. But even if such a consensus was lacking, permissive engagement remained possible *if and when one of the*

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<sup>8</sup> See Haas, Ernst B. *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*.



*superpowers was willing to swallow its principles* and make the necessary voluntary contribution to a peacekeeping operation.

During 1945-1985 some principles of interpositional peacekeeping emerged, including:

- the need for support by the mandating authority, the Security Council;
- the requirement that the operation be deployed only with the consent of the warring parties;
- the command and control of the Force by the UN;
- the special composition of the Force; and
- the restriction that force be used only in self-defense.

## **2. Constraints of Traditional Peacekeeping**

First doubts about the UN's effectiveness appeared in late 1970s and early 1980s. This period was characterized by the significant growth of non-referred serious conflicts that showed a trend toward disillusionment with the abilities of the international community to effectively settle armed disputes. Warring parties were more and more prone to tolerate than regulate a conflict.

After initial euphoria of early 1990s and Somalian and Yugoslav debacles the concept of peacekeeping as a multipurpose conflict resolution device has been considered as already overextended and unable to meet the dynamic contingencies of the future. According to some analysts, in reality the UN peacekeepers have, with mixed results,

already crossed the threshold of traditional peacekeeping operations into a new range of second generation tasks<sup>9</sup>.

*The main constraints of traditional peacekeeping have been as follows:*

1. A divided Security Council resulted in mandates which were sometimes based on a minimal area of common agreement, restrictive in scope and vaguely expressed. Often, following the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, no further adjustments could be made to the mandate and this reduced its effectiveness and credibility in the field and gave the appearance of weakness. As a result the peacekeepers' operational flexibility was reduced, which limited their ability to adapt their role to the needs of a changing situation.

2. Peacekeepers' impartiality in the Cold War missions was based on the mutually agreed disinterest of the Security Council. However, this disinterest often caused UN officials' passive response, and removed from the UN missions the operational flexibility needed to meet changing situations with an effective military presence in the field.

3. UN peacekeeping forces tended to operate only with the full cooperation of the parties concerned. Peacekeepers did not have the military means to enforce a mandate from the Security Council. The consent and cooperation of the interested parties was therefore essential for success. This meant that a Force could only be deployed once the conflict began to stalemate or stabilize and a political will prevailed between the parties to

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<sup>9</sup> See Mackinlay, John. *Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping*.

seek an alternative to violence. Peacekeepers could not operate successfully until these conditions were met.

4. A Peacekeeping Force normally operated under the command of the United Nations, and under the authority of the Security Council. Command in the field was exercised by a Force Commander appointed by and responsible to the Secretary-General. That sometimes made the chain of command ineffective.

5. According to the accepted principle of "equitable geographic representation", peacekeepers were drawn from middle level or small powers, some with only a limited military capability. The constrained and reactive tasks of peacekeeping did not demand more than this. In principle, nations with small, undeveloped military forces could, without threatening the parties involved, provide infantry units, while nations with more sophisticated military powers provided the support units.

6. Peacekeepers were not allowed to use force except in self-defense. The rules of engagement also tended to vary from Force to Force and in some Forces, particularly in the early phase of deployment, varied between contingents. Once deployed, the UN peacekeepers tended to report on, but not intervene in, violent incidents or violations of peace agreements. Escalating the response beyond the use of force in self-defense was regarded as enforcement. Without the power or authority to take problem-solving action, except at a very local level, peacekeepers had to rely more on their symbolic international presence and the moral pressures arising from the disapproval of the international community.

7. There was never much pressure on the UN planning staff to develop the capability to deploy or conduct an effective military operation. Although Force Commanders and individual staff officers published critical accounts of planning failures, particularly in the initial phases of deployment, there was no institutional process to learn these lessons and the same problems and mistakes occurred again at the initial phase of new forces. The strongest reason not to improve the system was the feeling in New York that, notwithstanding their short term discomforts and lack of effectiveness, the UN military presence was marginal to the success of the process.<sup>10</sup>

8. According to the UN official view, there have been two major problems that thwarted some recent peacekeeping missions. The principal problem has been the unwillingness of warring parties to seek peaceful solutions. Another major problem has been member states' failure to provide sufficient resources. Peacekeepers have been handed daunting tasks by the Security Council - but have not been given the means to carry them out.

For example, in 1994 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that peacekeeping commander would need 35,000 troops to deter attacks on the "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina created by the Security Council. Member states authorized 7,600 troops and took a year to provide them.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See Mackinlay, John. *Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping*. - The situation has radically changed now, when the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has established a Lessons Learned unit to capture lessons from PKOs and share them with future PKOs.

<sup>11</sup> See *United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance*. UN DPI, May 1997.

In Rwanda in 1994, faced with evidence of genocide, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously decided that 5,500 peacekeepers were urgently needed. But it took nearly six months for member states to provide the troops, even though 19 governments had pledged to keep 31,000 troops on a stand-by basis for UN peacekeeping.<sup>12</sup>

## ***B. THE NEW REQUIREMENTS TO PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA***

### **1. The distinctive features of the post-Cold War era**

Post-Cold War era is characterized by a number of new features.

First, there is an obvious change of dominant issues. Global changes have generated a new range of conflict. In addition to regional conflict, multi-ethnic states began to disintegrate, and internal rather than inter-state conflicts proliferated. Humanitarian emergencies worsened and fragile governments emerged to fill the vacuum created by superpower withdrawals.

The decisions of the UN have become more forceful based on a stronger consensus. The end of the Cold War removed some of the political tensions in the UN that had limited the scope and application of peacekeeping. No longer subject to superpower confrontation and competition, the Security Council has become increasingly effective with an enhanced ability to negotiate peace agreements in long-standing conflict zones. Mediatory, supervisory and peacekeeping operations have been mounted more frequently

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



over time and with more success. Peace forces were deployed with more explicit and firmly stated mandates than in the past.

The range of UN tasks had, de facto, been extended beyond the recognized limitations of "peacekeeping." In addition to the traditional roles of conventional observer missions and peacekeeping, UN forces were now involved in more complicated operations: supervising cease-fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the denial of an air space and the guarantee of rights of passage. In many of these operations local factions tended to resist the presence of UN troops as in Somalia, Bosnia and, to some extent, Cambodia.

This led to a conclusion that some kinds of disputes still cannot be handled effectively with military operations launched by international organizations with a traditional peacekeeping orientation.

Under these circumstances the concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but rigid form of the traditional prototype should undergo certain changes to adapt to the new conditions. An emerging era of international restructuring has brought with it a new range of operational tasks for the UN ("second generation tasks"). These are distinct from peacekeeping because UN forces do not necessarily enjoy the support of all the parties involved, and consequently will have to take much more rigorous steps to ensure their personnel safety and achieve the conditions required in the mandate. In some second

generation tasks, authorized under an enforcement mandate, heavy weapons systems including armored vehicles, combat aircraft, and warships may be deployed.

### ***SUMMARY***

Although the UN peacekeeping missions have been effective on the whole, they often did not meet the warring parties' demands, and thus more tended to "freeze" rather than solve the problem. That is why in many cases, especially in armed conflicts, parties preferred to manage a dispute without referring to the UN or regional organizations. Countries preferred to stay outside the conflict unless it had touched certain sensitive points of national interests.

Under the new global changes traditional peacekeeping missions have developed to a new type of peace operations - "second generation tasks". They fall between the techniques of peacekeepers and observers, and enforcement, and require more robust forces and rules of engagement (ROE).





## II. THEORETICAL PROVISIONS

Peace operations comprise a large spectrum of operations that the UN might undertake to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of its Charter in the face of a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."<sup>13</sup>

### A. FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

#### 1. New Classification of Peace Operations

Here we mostly stick to the classification framework proposed by William Durch.<sup>14</sup> These operations can be classified according to the **level of local consent** (as a working definition, we take "consent" to mean the agreement of a host government to a UN mission's presence<sup>15</sup>), **level of coercion (military force)**, and **complexity of objectives**. We assume that all these levels vary from zero to one.

*The level of local consent.* Most UN operations are undertaken with full local consent. In a multiparty conflict, however, some parties consent can be hard to maintain. Some factions within the host country, including armed elements, may object to that

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<sup>13</sup> UN Charter, Chapter VII. Web Site Electronic Version.

<sup>14</sup> *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. Ed. by William Durch. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY.: St. Martin Press. 1993; Durch W.J. *Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s*. In: UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s. /Ed. Durch W.J. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY: St. Martin's Press. 1996.

<sup>15</sup> *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. Ed. by William Durch. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY.: St. Martin Press. 1993. p. 5.

presence, and on occasion peacekeepers may need to use force as a last resort to defend themselves or restore order to a deteriorating field situation. This possibility can be observed from the example of the UN's 1960-64 operation in the Congo.

*The level of military force.* It can range from no force (as in mediation and preventive diplomacy) to a full-scale enforcement (for a peace enforcement action like the 1991 Gulf War).

*The level of complexity* may vary from one-objective missions (most traditional peacekeeping operations were normally focused on maintaining a cease-fire) through multi-purpose operations that involve many tasks (like the operation in Cambodia that was undertaken to prevent further clashes, create stable conditions and conduct elections) to peace enforcement that uses military force to stop hostilities, divide parties and create conditions for further agreements (IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia).

Peace operations according to these levels may be classified as **peacekeeping, multidimensional operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention.**

*Traditional peacekeeping* involves full local consent, single mission objectives and practically no use of force.

*Multidimensional operations* also involve nominally full consent, but their mandates tend to be much more complex than a traditional operation and they may encounter reduced levels of acceptance on the part of some local factions that may entail a restricted application of force.

*Peace enforcement operations* may have the consent of one party in a conflict, or one or more factions in a civil war, but they may also be directed against all combatants

equally; that is, they may operate without local belligerent consent. The complexity of peace enforcement operations and the force involved may also vary a great deal, from relatively straightforward operations to resist or suppress minor cross-border aggression to all-azimuth conflict suppression followed by the rebuilding of shattered governance.

*Humanitarian intervention* may vary considerably over time and in scale of operational complexity, level of consent, and force. The distribution of humanitarian relief must be accurately calculated because it may erode local consent and increase complexity, which entails more forceful measures and leads to a “slippery-slope” from humanitarian intervention to peace enforcement.<sup>16</sup>

Table 1 below presents our empirically assessed values at scale from 0 through 1 related to different PO’s types with regard to different levels of their background features.

**Table 1. Empirically Assessed Values of Peace Operations’ Background Features Related to Peace Operations Types**


PO Types/ Features	Consent	Complexity	Force
Peacekeeping	1	0.5	0 <sup>17</sup>
Multidimensional operation	1	1	0.5
Peace enforcement	0	1	1
Humanitarian intervention	0.5	1	0.5

<sup>16</sup> See *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, pp. 4-7. About probable “mission creep” during humanitarian intervention see also Durch W.J. *Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s*, pp. 4-6.

<sup>17</sup> Here the term “force” refers not so much to force structure of peacekeepers, but to use of force in terms of enforcement action - peacekeepers normally are not allowed to use force to implement UNSC resolutions, that is why it is “zero force” for them in the table. At the same time, most UN Peacekeeping Operations have a military component for self protection, troop cantonment, and demobilization. The current missions in Africa, MONUA & MINURSO, are traditional CHVI Peacekeeping Operations, but each has at least an armed battalion to monitor the cease-fire and compliance with the appropriate protocols.

The four types of peace operations may be compared and contrasted as represented in chart 1.

Chart 1. A Three-Dimensional Representation of Peace Operations



Peace operations may be also classified according to the **stage of conflict and level of violence**.

*Stages of conflict* include peace, crisis, war, cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

*Levels of violence* include low political tension, high political tension, low-level conflict and intense conflict.

According to these levels peace operations can vary at a larger scale and besides four types mentioned above include also **preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment**.



*Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Normally is applied at the early stages of conflict when there is a sufficiently low level of violence.

*Preventive (“deterrent”) deployments* include actions that would be intended to deter aggression by signaling the international community’s willingness to counter it militarily. The UN would deploy with the consent of the threatened party but with capabilities (and orders) to engage in combat as may be necessary. This task distinguishes such preventive combat deployments from peacekeeping. At the same time, any peacekeeping operation which is deployed to prevent hostilities from spreading may also be considered as a preventive deployment.

## **2. Comparison of Peace Operations**

Different types of peace operations relate to different conflicts and conflict stages. Table 2 shows the relationship between the various types of peace operations according to the stage and intensity of conflict.

**Table 2. Various Types of Peace Operations According to the Stage and Intensity of Conflict**


Stage	Intensity of violence	Low political tension		High political tension		Low-level conflict		Intense conflict	
		0	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8	1
Peace	0								
Peace	0.2		Preventive diplomacy						
Crisis	0.3		Preventive Deployment, Traditional Peace-keeping & Multidimensional operations						
Crisis	0.5			Multidimensional operation		Humanitarian intervention			
War	0.6					Humanitarian intervention		Peace enforcement	
War	1				Humanitarian intervention		Peace enforcement		
Cease-fire	0.4			Humanitarian intervention			Multidimensional operation		
Cease-fire	0.3		Traditional Peace-keeping & Multidimensional operations						
Cessation of hostilities	0.2		Traditional Peace-keeping						
Cessation	0								

Preventive diplomacy makes an effort to defuse political tensions before they erupt into warfare. If it appears that rising tensions might be tempered by the presence of international forces, then the UN or other suitable regional organizations might resort to a preventive deployment. If hostilities bring a growing burden on the population a humanitarian intervention may be mounted to ease that burden. However, it might be effective only when the level of violence does not exceed a low-level conflict. The outbreak of war might occasion a peace enforcement operation to suppress conflict; at the same time a humanitarian intervention may also be conducted. In both cases, the

international force may be intervening in the midst of ongoing combat, which makes their task much more difficult, countries contributing their troops harder to find, and unified command and control harder to achieve and maintain. Traditional peacekeeping (PKO) and multidimensional operations (MDO) normally deploy after peace has been achieved, but the area may still face more or less serious outbreak of fighting. Where that probability is thought especially high, or where any substantial outbreak of violence might shatter a fragile peace accord, the international operation may be configured for a mixed multidimensional operation and peace enforcement in an effort to deter such outbreaks, as was IFOR and is SFOR now in Bosnia.

The graphical presentation of the relationship between the types of peace operations, stage and intensity of conflict can be seen from the Charts 2 and 3.

Chart 2. Various Types of Peace Operations According to the Intensity of Conflict




To date, however, with the exception of the Korean War, which was under de facto American control, UN operations have all been intercessions after the fact. Operation Desert Storm was not under UN command, either technically or legally, though it occurred under UN resolutions. During the Cold War, UN efforts to terminate conflicts at an early stage were confined to diplomatic initiatives and occasional economic sanctions. On relatively rare occasions, cease-fires imposed by threats of Great Power military intervention were later overseen by UN peacekeepers. These were most effective



where the United States and the Soviet Union wielded great influence with the opposing sides, and both worked to smother the fighting. The best example is the 1973 Middle East War.

Chart 3. Various Types of Peace Operations According to Stages of Conflict



### 3. Preconditions of Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement

It is a matter of primary importance to clarify the relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, because every type requires specific preparatory work to gain sufficient public support. Marrack Goulding, UN Under-Secretary General for *Peacekeeping Operations*, defines peacekeeping in terms of what has worked historically, and what distinguishes it from other activities using military personnel. *Peacekeeping* is an operation that “requires the consent of the parties”, does “not involve

military enforcement measures”, but does ‘involve the deployment in the field of UN personnel... to help control and resolve actual or potential international conflicts or... internal conflicts which have a clear international dimension’<sup>18</sup>.

As for *Peace Enforcement*, according to the UN's official point of view, in the case of enforcement action, the UNSC gives member states the authority to take all necessary measures to achieve a stated objective. Consent of the parties is not necessarily required.<sup>19</sup>

By comparison to peacekeeping, enforcement actions impose much higher human and monetary costs on the countries who take an active role in them. Peace enforcement are more coercive means of enforcing collective security. The UN Charter specifies that enforcement actions should be measures of last resort, and to date that is what they have been. According to UN official information, it has been used in very few cases - in the Korean conflict in 1950, and, in the 1990s, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania.<sup>20</sup> These interventions, although endorsed by the Security Council, were directed by a single country or a group of countries. However, at least in three cases from this list (Korea, Iraq and Somalia) enforcement operations had very negative implications for the UN forces, warring parties and civilian population in terms of casualties.

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<sup>18</sup> The Evolving Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In: *The Singapore Symposium, The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping*, United Nations Document DPI/1141. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, September 1991, p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> See *United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance*. UN DPI, May 1997.

<sup>20</sup> See *United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance*. UN DPI, New York, May 1997.

In this regard it seems important to consider the conditions of successful third-party intervention in conflicts. Research in this field suggests the following conclusions:

1. On the whole, the success of intervention is determined by geostrategical factors and particularly by the combination of national interests pursued<sup>21</sup>.

2. To achieve the desired goals of intervention, policy makers should focus on how they intervene, rather than when or where.

3. A mixed strategy employing as many pressure points as possible is most effective.

4. Intervention is most likely to succeed if it is on behalf of the official state government.<sup>22</sup>

5. War weariness and a stalemate are the important factors in determining the outcome of conflict because they make earlier settlement more attractive.<sup>23</sup>

6. The variety of political, economic, and social factors often depicted as causes of conflicts may have little to do with determining their outcome, and the parties may agree to some *status quo* appeared in the course of fighting.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Freedman L. Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> See Regan P.M. Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.40, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 336-359. Analysis spans 50 years and 85 civil conflicts involving a total of 196 separate interventions.

<sup>23</sup> See Mason D.T., Fett P.J. How Civil Wars End. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.40, No.4, December 1996, pp.546-568. The study uses data of 127 post-World War II conflicts

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

## ***B. HYPOTHESES***

According to the theoretical assumptions, described above, we can formulate the following basic hypotheses concerning the peace operation in Bosnia.

*Hypothesis 1.* Peace operation in Bosnia initially was a traditional peacekeeping mission (UNPROFOR) conducted in the situation that required coercive measures. That is why later it was replaced by a multidimensional operation with some elements of peace enforcement (IFOR/SFOR).

*Hypothesis 2.* The external factors that have determined the success of NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia include a specific combination of national interests in Central and Eastern Europe, the employment of effective mixed strategy, the appeal of the official Bosnian government for the IFOR deployment, and the will of warring parties to compromise.

*Hypothesis 3.* The success of IFOR was determined by a number of internal factors, including war weariness and military stalemate; consent of all the parties to international intervention and to the status quo appeared before IFOR started.

*Hypothesis 4.* The IFOR (SFOR) is a prototype of a new international community's response to the new challenges of the modern world and represents that community's desire to more effectively settle the most dangerous and bloody conflicts.

## *SUMMARY*

Recent developments in international contingencies have set forward new requirements for peace operations that exceed the framework of traditional peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations have been complemented by preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, multidimensional operations, humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement. Enforcement and humanitarian assistance may be the most costly operations requiring more robust forces and more risks.

The main factors that determine the PO's success may include a general consensus on relevant national interests; the consent of warring parties, or at least of a host government, to the PO and to peace force composition; a combination of mixed strategy and peace force structure and strength; the degree of perceiving war weariness and conflict stalemate; a change in warring parties goals or in conflict situation that modifies these goals and makes a compromise possible.







### III. CIVIL WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA: CAUSES, CHRONOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE

The past is always present in the Balkans and defines the future. Centuries of history and myths shape daily events in the Balkans. Yugoslavia's violent breakup was the result of internal crisis caused by deep historical, economic, national and religious contradictions.

#### A. PREREQUISITES AND HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

*The role of conflict in Yugoslavia's history.* Conflict has always been an inherent feature of the Balkans life. Historically the Balkan region has offered little security to either persons or groups because it has always been a crossroads and a borderland between Europe and Asia.

*Ottoman Empire.* For 500 years the Balkans had stayed under Ottoman Empire. "The Ottoman Turks spent the better part of two centuries trying to conquer it,... and another three centuries losing control of their northern empire..."<sup>25</sup>. By the time of the Ottoman invasion, the Serbs had already developed a strong national character. Invasion by the Ottomans only served to intensify desires to maintain a Serbian identity. Equally important, this nationalism focused on a strongly chauvinistic Serbian Orthodox Church which served as a beacon for nationalist sentiment over the centuries, thus further

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<sup>25</sup> William J. Durch and James A. Schear. Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia. In: *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s.* /Ed. Durch W.J. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY: St. Martin's Press. 1996. P.196.

entangling the question of religion and ethnic identity.<sup>26</sup> Other national groups underwent similar circumstances.

*Independence and the Berlin congress.* Serbia, Romania, and an enlarged Montenegro received independence in 1878, after a long struggle, under the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which ended the Russo-Turkish War. The Congress of Berlin in that same year gave Austria-Hungary a mandate over Bosnia-Herzegovina that angered Serbia and Montenegro. In sum, according to the noted European historian Carlton J. H. Hayes, "If before 1878 the 'Eastern Question' concerned one 'sick man', after 1878 it involved a half-dozen maniacs. For the Congress of Berlin drove the Balkan peoples mad."<sup>27</sup>

Another thirty years before W.W.I were saturated with continuous conflicts between new independent states and increasing tensions between the Great Powers. The Great Powers many times imposed peace settlements on the Balkans that, however, permanently left nationalist expectations unfulfilled. The conflictual environment was further undermined by the policies of the external powers, which exploited regional conditions in order to extend their spheres of influence.

*WW I and its implications.* This brought about two short, brutal wars that rearranged the political face of the Balkans once again in 1912-13. They also set the stage for the Balkan crisis of July 1914, which turned the third Balkan War into World War I.

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<sup>26</sup> Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, pp. 218-219.

<sup>27</sup> Carlton J.H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900*, New York: Harper, 1941, p. 33.

The various alignments of the powers during the course of the war contributed to unresolved tensions (territorial disputes) that continued to afflict the region after the post-war settlements. Another critical consequence of the war was the considerable devastation that significantly set back the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.<sup>28</sup> Finally, most states within the Balkans perceived the peace treaties following the war to be imposed and unjust.<sup>29</sup>

The postwar settlement brought Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro together with several fragments of the former Austro-Hungarian empire (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Vojvodina) into a new state - the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, the authoritarian regime of the inter-war era failed to resolve outstanding religious, ethnic, and nationalist problems left over from World War I.

*W.W.II and division of the Balkans.* Under Nazi assault in 1941, Yugoslavia swiftly dissolved, to be replaced by the pro-Nazi "Ustashe" regime in Croatia, while mostly Serbs and Montenegrins actively fought the occupier. German and Italian reprisals

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<sup>28</sup> According to documents provided at the Versailles Peace Conference, Yugoslavia suffered 1,900,000 deaths (from all causes) during World War I. Of the 705,343 men Serbia mobilized during the war, 369,815 were killed or died of wounds. Similarly, Montenegro lost about 63,000 people, or roughly 25 percent of its prewar population. - See: L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, pp. 632-633; Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmečić, *History of Yugoslavia*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, p. 501; Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 222-226.

<sup>29</sup> William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. Revised Edition. Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. November 7, 1995, p.22.

exacted a tremendous toll on Yugoslavia, but especially gross atrocities during W.W.II were committed against the Serbs.<sup>30</sup>

The post-World War II division of the Balkans temporarily checked the warfare that has plagued the region. 'Largely the result of the imposition of Communist regimes in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and the fear that local conflict could lead to superpower involvement, the region entered a seeming state of suspended historical animation.'<sup>31</sup>

*Tito's period and ripening "grapes of wrath"*. Under Tito's rule any ethnic hostilities in the post WW II Yugoslavia were stopped and effectively prevented through Tito's skillful manipulations, but mostly due to the average Yugoslav's income growing steadily during Tito's lifetime. After Tito died in 1980, the average Yugoslav's income shrank in real terms.<sup>32</sup> At the same time there had always been a considerable wealth gap between different republics of Yugoslavia. By 1974, for example, the population of Slovenia, the richest republic, was eight times wealthier, on average, than the population of Kosovo, the poorest.<sup>33</sup> There had also formed and developed tensions between urban and rural populations.

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<sup>30</sup> Total casualties of Yugoslavs in WW II came to approximately 1.7 million dead, mostly the Serbs, out of a population of 16 million. - See Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 415.

<sup>31</sup> William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma*, p. 24.

<sup>32</sup> See Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 31, 35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

*The beginning of the crisis.* As the economy failed, so did the political cohesion that was represented in collective presidency and Yugoslavia's Communist Party that fell apart in January 1990. As the democratic changes prevailed all over the Europe, nationalist sentiments and past animosities in Yugoslavia, constrained by Tito, quickly bubbled to the surface. The political leaders of several Yugoslav republics irresponsibly used nationalistic feelings for personal political ends. However, it was not just a struggle among leaders. Many Serbs, Croats and other Yugoslavs willingly jumped into bloody fighting, seeking to solve their problems and avenge past offenses.<sup>34</sup>

## ***B. ANALYSIS OF UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS***

The conflict in the Balkans was caused by a number of interacting factors.

*Local features.* Strong national character based on awareness of ethnic identity as an ultimate value, and steeled by the 500 years of Ottoman rule, created a very strong will of many in the Balkans to die or kill to protect their dignity. Historical offenses and injustices permanently left nationalist expectations unfulfilled and religious animosities unresolved. The interference of the Great Powers seeking to extend their spheres of influence exacerbated the situation. As a result, violence had always been an accepted agent of changing and rearranging the political face of the Balkans. These factors

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<sup>34</sup> Ted Gurr, however, argues that historical animosities or religious differences do not play crucial role in the origins and dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict. "Such factors usually become significant because they are invoked by contemporary ethnopolitical leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened and disadvantaged peoples..." - Ted R. Gurr. *Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict*. In: *Managing Global Chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict*./Ed. by Chester A. Crocker et. al. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., p. 74.



determined lack of will to compromise because historically compromise represented weakness and defeat that frequently in the past had meant death.

*Historical, political, economical and personalities' implications.* Past historical memories were complicated by more recent contingencies. Atrocities committed during WW II against the Serbs not only by Germans and Italians but also by their fellow countrymen left a deep scar on the Yugoslav political face.<sup>35</sup> Economic tensions, social and cultural contradictions were constrained by Tito's manipulations, and not solved.

In 1980s Yugoslavia was weakened by its loss of the critical geopolitical position it had occupied during the Cold War. This left the country with little strategic significance, no alternative markets, and no new base for political and economic security. Economic decline, accentuated by diminishing support from Western governments and institutions, tore the economic and social fabric apart. That led to a political disintegration that was inseparable from the more widespread process of European political fragmentation at the end of the Cold War. Economic reforms demanded by foreign creditors undermined the Yugoslav federal authority. In a highly decentralized government, local political leaders, unwilling to compromise, began a quarrel over authority, resources, and, ultimately, territory. The key Yugoslav protagonists' (Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic) behavior was driven by nationalist sentiments. The declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, precipitated the crisis. However, both republics might have been content to work out a loose federal agreement with Belgrade. But Milosevic insistence on

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<sup>35</sup> David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*. NY: Harcourt Brace, 1996.



Serb political predominance in a federal Yugoslavia closed that option.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, Izetbegovic's and Tudjman's unwillingness to consider Serb interests and sentiments also strained the situation.<sup>37</sup> War ensued.

*International response.* The international community in 1991 misinterpreted the upheaval as ethnic conflict and national revolution in the course of democratization, so it could not respond correctly.<sup>38</sup> The EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was highly controversial and was determined mostly not by principles of self-determination and impartiality but by the need to preserve the EC's unity. Moreover, conflicts emerged between European states, echoing the ominous confrontation before WW I: German's proposals were openly defied by France and Great Britain. The recognition of Bosnia that was made a few months later without effective guarantees precipitated violence, which was not surprising given the new state's geographic location and the clear opposition of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats that constituted substantial national minorities in that country.<sup>39</sup> The Western states took side of the Croats and Bosnian government, and at the same time refused to recognize and imposed sanctions on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), although all the parties to conflict could be blamed

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<sup>36</sup> See Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. NY: T.V. Books, 1996.

<sup>37</sup> See David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*. NY: Harcourt Brace, 1996.

<sup>38</sup> See Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995.

<sup>39</sup> See Marten Van Heuven, Understanding the Balkan Breakup: the three book review. *Foreign Policy*, No.103, Summer 1996, pp. 179-180.

for noncompliance with the conditions agreed to by EC.<sup>40</sup> EC countries were not prepared to back up their diplomacy with force. That made the situation even more complicated and pushed the parties to search for a solution by means of violence: the Croats and Muslims understood the recognition as a signal of support of all their actions; the Serbs felt themselves pushed to the corner.

All peace plans (Vance-Owen and other initiatives) were ultimately disavowed by the warring parties because they did not meet their demands. EC countries were not prepared to go beyond a negotiated peace agreed to by all the parties. Meanwhile the parties did not see major powers involved, namely, Russia, Germany and Turkey, as honest brokers in the crisis. The United States showed clear unwillingness to exert itself on behalf of an unjust outcome. This sentiment, coupled with a determination not to become involved militarily, was fundamental in shaping international community approach in 1991-1993.

*The UN's role.* Under these circumstances the UN was ineffective due to the unwillingness of the major powers to commit military forces sufficient to implement the principles proclaimed by the Security Council resolutions. The collapse of the UN 'safe

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<sup>40</sup> The conditions agreed were based on guidelines elaborated by France for recognition of new states emerging in Europe and included:

- acceptance of the United Nations, Helsinki Act and Paris Charter commitments on the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
- guarantees of ethnic and minority rights;
- acceptance of the inviolability of frontiers;
- honoring disarmament and regional security commitments;
- arbitration to decide a structure to replace the old state;
- acceptance of the draft agreement on Yugoslavia's future, elaborated by the EC peace conference.

haven” concept, when the UN peacekeepers were not able to prevent the Muslims from using the havens for their military purposes thus provoking the Serbs to attack them, as well as to prevent the Serb atrocities after some of the save havens fell to their hands, was the result of UNPROFOR’s incapacity.

*Taking sides in the conflict.* These conditions encouraged the conflict parties to tighten their demands and continue fighting. Under these circumstances, as it has already been many times in the history of POs, outside mediators decided to take sides in the conflict, press upon the stronger party (the Serbs) and make it accept the conditions of peace agreement proposed by the US. The Serbs were warned that their military potential must be destroyed. NATO commander for Southern Europe Admiral Leighton Smith and UN Force commander Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier on 10 August, 1995 signed “Memorandum of understanding” (MOU) on the execution of NATO air operations for protection of the UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>41</sup> By that time the conflict had come to a stalemate, and the belligerents had already begun to understand their inability to achieve their goals by military force.

*Russia’s role.* Russia, with its historical sympathies to the Serbs, had been deeply involved in the Balkan conflict contributing a substantial military force for UNPROFOR and was also seeking ways to resolve the conflict. Russian peace initiatives played a significant role in attempts of the international community to stop hostilities in former

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<sup>41</sup>*Smith and Janvier Sign Agreement on NATO Air Operations* - [HTTP://www.hrt.hr/vijesti/ oluja/ 950810/ E100895194604.html](http://www.hrt.hr/vijesti/oluja/950810/E100895194604.html).

Yugoslavia. However, like the other peace proposals and plans, they failed to satisfy all the warring parties while the Serbs controlled 70 percent of the Bosnian territory. The situation changed after the Sarajevo market shelling in August 1995 that was assigned to the Serbs artillery and followed by massive NATO air strikes and offensive of Bosnian government troops against Serb positions. The Serbs accused NATO of “genocide”, however, the latter denied that accusation, and stated that the only purpose was to make the Serbs pull their heavy weapons out of the safety zone around Sarajevo.<sup>42</sup>

At the same time, while the Western countries decided to put pressure upon the Serbs to end the conflict, Russia began feeling itself more and more isolated from the process of decision-making on Bosnia, especially after the MOU with NATO was signed. The point of primary concern for Russia was that this document, in particular, gave NATO the right of independent decision-making on using force in Bosnia.<sup>43</sup> The situation became even more exacerbated after the Sarajevo market shelling that set the start of the NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The Russian leadership felt themselves so adversely impacted by this fact that President Yeltsin issued a statement on 7 September, 1995. In that statement, Yeltsin said that the ongoing NATO air strikes and artillery shelling of the Bosnian Serbs undermined efforts for a political settlement and went beyond the limits of the UNSC’s decisions. They drew the international community into a

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<sup>42</sup> See Goltz, Alexandre. NATO Is Splitting Europe. *“Krasnaya Zvezda”*, Sept. 14, 1995, p.3.

<sup>43</sup> Russian leadership complained that this MOU was never discussed with Russia. This “veil of secrecy” even more exacerbated Russia - NATO relations, although later this confidential document was eventually published by Russian media. - See Markushin, Vadim and Alexandre Oleinik. A Memorandum of “Peacekeeping” - a Deal Behind the Russia’s Back. *“Krasnaya Zvezda”*, Sept.15, 1995, p.3.



conflict against one of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia. He said, Russia would have to carefully weigh its strategy and its approach to relations with the North Atlantic alliance, if such a policy continued.<sup>44</sup>

*Negotiations start.* On 8 September, 1995 a meeting in Geneva among the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) resulted in the announcement of an agreement among those Governments on the basic principles for a peace accord. Those principles included the continued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its present international borders, and for Bosnia to consist of two democratic entities, the existing Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, with a 51 percent to 49 percent territorial division between the two entities.

However, air strikes continued till 13 September, to make the Serbs comply with the NATO ultimatum and pull out their heavy weapons out of the 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. At the same time the Bosnian government, despite the UN and NATO's call upon all the parties to cease immediately all offensive military activities and hostile acts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>45</sup>, decided to capitalize on the moment, and launched a successful offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. By 12 October, 1995, when the truce agreement came into force, the Muslim-Croat Federation had regained a

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<sup>44</sup> Security Council. Press Release SC/6096. 8 September 1995. GOPHER://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/sc6096.

<sup>45</sup> Joint statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Press Release (95)85. 14 September 1995. HTTP://gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/pr85.95.

substantial part of territory lost during 1991-1994, and controlled about 50 percent of the Bosnian territory while another 50 percent remained under Serb control.

*Creation of the coalition.* In the end of September, 1995 the ministers of foreign affairs from Bosnia, Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia met in New York and agreed to conduct elections in Bosnia, adopt a Constitution, elect president and court. It was agreed that the guarantor of this process would be NATO-led force including Russian military contingent that must replace the UN troops and control the implementation of peace agreement. At the same time there were still some ‘technical problems’, and the most difficult among them was the chain of command - Russia did not want to submit its troops under NATO command.

After the general concept of Bosnian peace operation was adopted, NATO demonstrated a flexible approach toward Russia’s form of participation in planning and command procedures. Initially Russian leadership proposed to create a special International Committee or Council for political guidance of the mission. This Committee was proposed to include the countries contributing military contingents and responsible for the mission conduct. Russian side also proposed two types of the chain of command:

1). Russian contingent is placed under Russian command that reports directly to this special Committee;

2). A unified command is created as a kind of a Military Staff under the special Committee where a Russian representative among others has the right of a decisive vote.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> See Interview with Colonel General Vladimir Zhurbenko, First Deputy of the Chief of General Staff of Russian Armed Forces. *Krasnaya Zvezda*”, October 18, 1995, p.3.



The final concept of Russian participation in peace operation in Bosnia was worked out during the meetings of Russian Defense Minister with his US and NATO counterparts in October and November 1995. A compromise was achieved to create a special Consultative Committee comprised of NATO and Russian representatives. This Committee would conduct regular meetings at ambassadors' level or higher and implement the political guidance of the Bosnian mission. Russia would be informed of all decisions, give recommendations to the NATO Council and influence all decisions related to the Russian contingent.<sup>47</sup>

The problem of the military control of a Russian brigade operating in an American division was also successfully solved. To get around the problem it was agreed that Russia's 2,000-3,000 troops would be commanded by a Russian general. The general in turn would report to U.S. General George Joulwan, NATO's top commander. Russian troops would be assigned peacekeeping tasks separate from the NATO peace implementation force, and therefore would not technically come under NATO's chain of command.<sup>48</sup>

*Dayton agreements.* On 21 November 1995, three of the main parties to the conflict in former Yugoslavia reached agreement on a framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The talks had been taking place at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in

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<sup>47</sup> See Peltz, Alexandre. Russia Will Participate in Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia on a Par with NATO, and Not Subordinate to It. "*Krasnaya Zvezda*", October 30, 1995, p.1.

<sup>48</sup> U.S., Russia Iron Out Agreement on Peace Force. *CNN daily reports on the Balkan conflict*. November 9, 1995. [HTTP://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-08/troops/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-08/troops/index.html).

Dayton, Ohio for 20 days. The formal signing of the agreement took place 14 December 1995 in Paris. The "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" covered a broad range of areas, including the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops, post-conflict peace building, and a remodeling of the political structures to accommodate the different fractions. The military aspects of the plan were drawn up in Annex 1A: Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement. By signing the agreement, the three parties agreed to the plan and to the deployment of a Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) lead by NATO. IFOR substituted the UN military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had been conducting peacekeeping tasks since their introduction into the area in 1992.

On 15 December 1995 the Security Council, "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter", authorized Member States to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR), under unified control and command "to ensure compliance with the provisions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina."<sup>49</sup>

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
<sup>49</sup> Security Council Unanimously Authorizes Multinational Military Implementation Force to Ensure Compliance with Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Security Council. SC/6143. 15

December 1995. HTTP: [gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/sc6143](http://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/sc6143).

## SUMMARY

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia stemmed from multiple interacting causes that are represented in Chart 4.<sup>50</sup>

**Chart 4. Multiple Causes of the Yugoslav Crisis**



Multiple peace initiatives aimed at stopping hostilities failed because they did not meet the parties' demands. Peacekeeping operation UNPROFOR also could not surmount the rising resentment of the local factions. Bloody fights continued in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia, during 1991-1995 until the warring parties agreed to cease fire.

One of the reasons for that agreement was that the conflict had come to a stalemate, and conflict parties already clearly understood their inability to achieve their goals by means of military force. Another important factor was that the Serbs, as the stronger party, having seized 70 % of the Bosnian territory, was put under strong

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<sup>50</sup> The Chart is based on William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma*, pp. 5-6.

international political and military pressure and began losing their territorial gains. Russia with its traditional relations with the Serbs also understood that the conflict had come to a stalemate, grudgingly had to give up some principles, and push Milocevic and Karadzic to agree to fifty-fifty partition of Bosnia. After the Muslims and Croats regained a substantial part of territory lost during 1991-1994 war, and with about 50 percent of Bosnian territory remaining under Serb control, the international pressure shifted to another conflict party – the Bosnian government, and hostilities were eventually stopped.

From Russia's and NATO part a lot of flexibility and compromise was shown while the coalition was forming, particularly in solving the problem of chain of command.

The Dayton Peace Accord signed in November 1995 was a remarkable event that brought an end to a dangerous turmoil in Europe. On 20 December, after the UNSC resolution 1031 was approved, authorizing the establishment of IFOR, the new mission took over operations in Bosnia from UNPROFOR and peacekeeping responsibilities transferred to NATO command.

#### **IV. UNPROFOR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: FAILURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

UNPROFOR is the biggest, the most expensive and the most complex peace operation in the history of the United Nations. Its goals were both military and political in nature: to keep the peace and build confidence between the warring sides; to help achieve a final political solution; and to restore normal life to former Yugoslavia.

##### ***A. UNPROFOR'S CHRONOLOGY AND MISSIONS***

*Historical background.* UNPROFOR was initiated after the Yugoslav collective presidency and the Federal Assembly on 27 December 1991 asked the United Nations to take over control of the peace process from European Council. On 8 January, 1992 the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved the deployment of an advance force in the planned operation to send 10,000 United Nations peacekeeping troops to Yugoslavia. An advance party led by the first Force Commander, General Satish Nambiar of India, arrived in Croatia on March 8, 1992 to prepare the deployment of the UN Protection Force.

On 7 April 1992 after fights broke out in Bosnia the UN SC passed Resolution 749 on the full deployment of the UN Protection Force. The number of UNPROFOR personnel, including military, police and civilian staff, as of March 1995, totaled more than 40,000 people from 29 countries.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> *Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR.* Department of Public Information, United Nations. 31 August, 1996. [HTTP://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm)



During the UNPROFOR mandate fatalities total number reached 210, among them 199 were military personnel. 73 peacekeepers were killed in hostile acts and more than 500 wounded.<sup>52</sup>

Besides UNPROFOR's civil and military departments, several relief and other international agencies took part in the UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia. They included the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Culture and Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union Task Force (ECTF).

*UNPROFOR's missions and their accomplishment.* UNPROFOR was initially, established in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure that the three "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. In the course of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was enlarged to include monitoring functions in certain other areas of Croatia ("pink zones"); to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and to

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<sup>52</sup> *Fatalities by Mission and Appointment Type.* United Nations Fatalities. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. [HTTP: //www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal1.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal1.htm)



include monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula and to ensure control of the Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones".

In addition, UNPROFOR monitored implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities in March 1994 following a flare-up of fighting in January and September 1993.

In June 1992, as the conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and its environs. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In addition, the Force monitored the "no-fly" zone, banning all military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo.

UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in self-defense, and to coordinate with NATO the use of air power in support of its activities. Similar arrangements were subsequently extended to the territory of Croatia. UNPROFOR also monitored the implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces in February 1994. In addition, UNPROFOR monitored cease-fire

arrangements negotiated between Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs forces, which entered into force on 1 January 1995.

In December 1992, UNPROFOR was also deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to monitor and report any developments in its border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in that Republic and threaten its territory. On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations.

UNPROFOR is considered “an improvised, last-resort operation”<sup>53</sup> that was a general failure. It did not manage to effectively monitor cease-fire, protect safe zones and provide conditions for continuous humanitarian assistance.

## ***B. ANALYSIS OF UNPROFOR***

*Roots of failure.* The deployment of the UN forces began in a country that was falling apart, and although the new parts of it were recognized by the international community, their governments were not in control of the territories they claimed. The UN’s mission required the cooperation of the warring parties. Such cooperation was not to be found, however, because the Vance-Owen plan did not address the issue that triggered the conflict - who rules the Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. This plan gave UNPROFOR no license to implement agreed provisions by force. When it was

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<sup>53</sup> William J. Durch and James A. Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, p. 249.

realized that implementing the Vance-Owen plan was impractical, the UN operation had already failed to justify the expectations of the conflict parties.

What is striking is the number of the Security Council resolutions and presidential statements adopted during 1992-1995 in connection with the former Yugoslavia: there are more than one hundred of them. They are indicative of the different character of this mission's mandate, with many ambiguities and contradictions. The readiness of the Security Council to set a new assignment to the operation combined with its reluctance to approve the funds necessary impeded the peace-keepers' work on the ground.

Disagreements among the Security Council members often resulted in impasses. The countries which had contributed troops, and the big powers which had no troops of their own on the ground took different positions toward the use of force, or with regard to the lifting of the arms embargo from the Bosnian government. That created the impression that the international community was very much divided.

UNPROFOR, in the eyes of the parties, took sides in the conflict from the very beginning. Without the UN's arrival in 1992, the JNA might have remained engaged in Croatia to the advantage of the local Serbs. In Bosnia the UN's intervention actually changed the war's outcome from a quick Serb win to a war of attrition. Even UNPROFOR's humanitarian efforts in Bosnia (reopening traffic, food delivery, etc.) actually favored the Muslims, giving them strategic depth and interior lines of

communication. It was the Croats and Muslims who clearly gained the most from the UN's presence, and the Serbs saw that.<sup>54</sup>

At the final stage of the operation UNPROFOR became "militarily engaged" (in UN's words) and openly took sides in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs, thus finally losing the UN's image of impartiality.

"UNPROFOR, neither loved nor feared by any of the parties, found itself handicapped in promoting dialogue and lacking the clout necessary to compel hostile parties to negotiate".<sup>55</sup>

So, when in December 1995 UNPROFOR was replaced by IFOR there were no regrets about this from any side.

*UNPROFOR's achievements.* However, UNPROFOR did have some gains. UNPROFOR can claim credit for having helped to prevent a larger conflict, and did not give it any chance to spill over the borders of Croatia and Bosnia. The UN also managed to protect small minorities from violence in the higher risk areas, and also carried out an enormous humanitarian task. It managed to monitor cease-fire along the Muslim-Croat line of confrontation. The UN's presence actually saved Sarajevo and delayed the collapse

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<sup>54</sup> William J. Durch and James A. Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, pp. 223, 252.

<sup>55</sup> See William J. Durch and James A. Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, pp. 249-250.

of Srebrenica and Zepa for more than two years - its humanitarian assistance allowed it to bring several hundred thousand tons of relief supplies into Bosnia.<sup>56</sup>

Actually, UNPROFOR prepared the grounds for IFOR. It had closely cooperated with NATO during the whole length of the conflict. The relations between UNPROFOR and NATO were voluminous. The NATO marine forces were patrolling the Adriatic, where they were overseeing and enforcing the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The NATO aircraft were enforcing the Security Council "no-fly" resolution, by preventing the military aircraft of the warring sides to fly over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO was also giving close air support when the lightly armed UN personnel got into situations in which they could not defend themselves against armed attacks. Besides that, at the request of the UN, NATO carried out air strikes in the so-called "no heavy weaponry areas" and "safe areas".

Thus, UNPROFOR made some very important preconditions for NATO-led intervention and also contributed its experienced personnel to it. Prior to IFOR's deployment several elements that had been part of UNPROFOR transferred to NATO command. General Janvier became deputy to IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith, who as NATO CINCSOUTH had been in command of NATO air forces operating over Bosnia. The majority of UNPROFOR's NATO and non-NATO contingents also transferred to NATO command.

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<sup>56</sup> From July 1992 until April 1995 there were roughly 265,000 tons of food and other relief items brought to Sarajevo by airlift and road convoys. - See William J. Durch and James A. Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, pp. 250-251.



## *SUMMARY*

UNPROFOR is considered a general failure. It did not manage to effectively monitor the cease-fire, protect safe zones, or provide conditions for continuous humanitarian assistance.

There were several objective causes for that.

The Security Council's strategy was a reflection of the political disagreements between the organization's major member states. That led to a cautious, risk-averse field operation.

The UN's mission from the very beginning stuck to an impractical Mandate and peace plan, with the task to support partial cease-fires under controversial political agendas. Thus, the UN presence actually helped to 'push the conflict around', while its humanitarian intervention became obvious targets of manipulation by the warring factions. Moreover, this intervention affected the local balance of power, and thus even made local parties suspicious or contemptuous of the intervention, rather than supportive or respectful.

The UNPROFOR intervention lacked impartiality from the very beginning, and was subject to manipulation, thus actually causing negative attitudes of all the conflict parties. On the final stage of the operation the UN troops finally traded their impartiality for open partisanship in the conflict.

However, UNPROFOR did have some essential achievements. It isolated the conflict and even abated it to some extent. It played an invaluable role in humanitarian



relief, and allowed humanitarian agencies to carry out their work. The UN's troops arrival also played an important role in preventing the Yugoslav army (JNA) from open and active participation in the civil war, although it eventually stretched out the conflict.

There are obviously limits to the UN peace efforts in a fierce civil war. The UN forces on the ground may serve only as a temporary instrument for lessening the cruelties of an armed conflict and the plight of the innocent population. At the same time, any mandate to operate in an active war zone is bound to be charged politically. However, the results scored by them in Bosnia are indisputable and their presence there was more than justifiable.

The UN's attempt to intervene in the height of the brutal civil war even more deserves all the respect because when nobody wanted to sacrifice, this organization made an outstanding effort to stop the war. It failed to do this, but paved the way for the "second echelon" force - NATO-led IFOR.



## V. IFOR/SFOR'S ASSESSMENT

The decision to create the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (familiarily known as the Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the international community's objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. It marked also the general concert about national objectives among the main geopolitical players in the region: United States, NATO and Russia. For Russia complying with this general concert required much more concessions than from its Western counterparts. The list of failures of Russian foreign policy published by "Nezavisimaya gazeta" at the end of 1995 stated that "Russia has been ousted from the process of the Balkans and Middle East settlement", while among the successes listed was the agreement on Russian brigade participation in NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia.<sup>57</sup> Anyway, by "swallowing its principles" Russian leadership contributed to the end of the Yugoslav wars that had a significant effect on the calculations of Russian nationalist forces of the costs and benefits of intervention in Serb interests as well as on behalf of the millions of Russians who live outside the borders of the Russian Federation.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Nezavisimaya gazeta. 30 December, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>58</sup> Reneo Lukic, Allen Lynch. *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*. [HTTP://www.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/llbk1.html](http://www.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/llbk1.html)

IFOR's primary mission was to maintain cessation of hostilities, move Serbs and Croats into separate zones, and provide support for civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords. The Russian brigade deployed in IFOR was initially 1,500 strong and was drawn from the 98th Guards Airborne Division based at Ivanovo in the Moscow Military District. In Bosnia, the brigade was under operational C2 of American commander, multinational division North, and based around the Posavina corridor. That was one of the most important and difficult missions regarding the significance applied by the warring parties to that parcel of land.

‘The relationship of the US-led TF Eagle and the separate Russian Airborne Brigade is one of operational normalcy. The Russian Brigade, one of five TF maneuver brigades, operates smoothly and seamlessly with its US headquarters and multinational sister units. This success was not an accident: it is a result of careful planning, a common strategic objective and unparalleled professionalism.’<sup>59</sup>

#### ***A. MILITARY SUCCESS VS. FULL-SCALE SETTLEMENT?***

While NATO forces and their partners in IFOR have played a critical and successful role in halting the conflict in Bosnia and bringing stability to the region, military success in the short term has not led to a long-term political settlement. Such a resolution is primarily determined by resolving internal political, economic, and societal issues within

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<sup>59</sup> Major Charles J. McLaughlin, US Army. US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace. *Military Review*, July-August 1997, No. 4, pp. 129-131.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this mostly depends on the will of the former warring factions (FWF). As William Johnsen noted, ‘Near universal agreement exists that a long-term resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in the factions, assisted by the international community, implementing the civil portions of the peace agreement.’<sup>60</sup> However, the ability of an outside military presence to sustain conditions that support the other elements of the peace process in Bosnia has played a crucial role in establishing important preconditions for resolving these issues.

### **1. The Criteria of Success**

*Low casualties.* The PO in Bosnia was a military success in terms of low casualties. Certainly, the resolution to implement the Dayton Accords has deterred the warring factions both from targeting each other as well as IFOR personnel. Even so, critics were quick to point out that IFOR's role was passive and reactive insofar as it had to wait until lives had been threatened before it could act. However, other than casualties suffered from accidents and landmines, IFOR was never attacked.

*Rules of engagement.* One reason for this relative security was that, beyond having massive firepower at its disposal, all IFOR units (both NATO and non-NATO) operated under the same robust rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE went beyond the right to use deadly force in self defense to include the right for IFOR to use force to accomplish its mission.

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<sup>60</sup> William T. Johnsen. *U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. June 20, 1996.

*"Mission creep"*. Another reason for this relative security was a strong opposition of the military to "mission creep" and assigning IFOR police functions, in particular, tracking down the indicted war criminals. That function was the responsibility of the civilian side of the peace implementation operation. IFOR personnel had the authority to detain any persons who interfered with the IFOR mission or those individuals who might be indicted for war crimes, but they did not try to track them down. This was not wishful thinking, but sober calculation. The situation represented a complex dilemma for IFOR: having to treat with those it must apprehend (Tujman and Milocevic, in particular). Staying aside of police functions has largely promoted the image of peacekeepers as impartial force, facilitated their cooperation with FWF, and contributed to creating safe conditions of the operation.

*Political dimension.* Of equal importance to the military success was the political dimension. The international community, the Russian and US governments in particular, have invested much effort and political capital in creating an environment in which the parties in former Yugoslavia have more of a stake in peace than in prosecuting the civil war any further. Unlike Somalia and Rwanda, prior to beginning of IFOR mission there was established the cooperation of the leaders of the warring factions and guaranteed their cooperation with the peace-keepers. The US Administration did not commit the strength of a potent military force until after it had negotiated an agreement that the warring parties themselves wanted to see succeed.

"In simple terms, there was a carrot as well as a stick."<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Peter Saracino. Mean Dogs and Wise Owls Need Each Other. *International Defense Review*. July 1, 1996. Vol. 29; No. 7 ; P. 1.



## 2. IFOR/SFOR's Achievements

*IFOR's missions and their accomplishment.* In the military sphere, IFOR has accomplished much in a short period. The primary mission of IFOR's Operation Joint Endeavor was to ensure compliance among the parties to the Dayton peace agreement, especially in the cessation of hostilities, establishment of zones of separation between opposing forces, and in the establishment of "cantonments" of heavy arms. This was accomplished. Its secondary mission was to assist in the prevention of interference of the movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence. That was accomplished also. IFOR also contributed greatly to freedom of movement by monitoring and clearing minefields as well as by building or repairing roads and bridges.<sup>62</sup>

The IFOR mission has been successful since its very early stages and substantial compliance with the Peace Agreement (PA) has been monitored.

In particular, Joint Military Commissions were established immediately and have been very effective in allowing proper exchange of information among all concerned parties. No significant military activity has been conducted by the Parties throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR has been granted the requested freedom of movement. Air defense radars were shut down. Negotiations began -- under the auspices of the OSCE -- to discuss confidence-building and arms reductions issues. Parties have complied with

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<sup>62</sup> This assessment is made on the basis of Task Force Eagle's Measure of Success Matrix. See *Joint Military Commissions. Newsletter No. 96-8. Appendix A.* Center for Army Lessons Learned. Sept. 1996.

IFOR instructions to vacate selected positions along the confrontation line in the Sarajevo area.

However, IFOR failed to obtain substantial cooperation from the FWF and did not succeed in building confidence between them.<sup>63</sup>

On December 20, 1996 ceremonies were held marking the end of the IFOR mandate and the beginning of the SFOR's mandate.

*SFOR's missions and their accomplishment.* It was decided that a force smaller than IFOR but more robust than traditional UN peacekeeping forces was needed to provide shift from "implementation to stabilization". Recognizing that maintaining a reduced military presence would be necessary to stabilize the peace after IFOR's mandate, NATO initiated operation JOINT GUARD in December 1996 and set up the Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the same rules of engagement, but reduced force structure, and with a mandate until June 1998. One of the tasks of SFOR is the prevention of a resumption of fighting, to help civil organizations rebuild the war-torn country and provide security for local elections. It was stated that it would be more the task of the Bosnian government to keep Bosnia's peace and stability.

The new mission was assigned with approximately 30,000 troops to start, and approximately 13,500 troops at the end of 1997. SFOR includes approximately 8,500 US troops, and consists of relatively more non-NATO troops. During IFOR, 15% of the

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

troops originated from non-NATO states but with SFOR this percentage has risen to 40%.<sup>64</sup>

IFOR had created the basis for a secure environment, but that foundation was fragile, and much remained to be accomplished by SFOR: arbitrate control of Brcko (accomplished), resettle refugees (not accomplished), build political institutions (accomplished), hold elections (accomplished), restore the Bosnian economy (positive processes began), negotiate and implement arms control and confidence-building regimes (partially accomplished), bring the war criminals to the prosecution (mostly not accomplished).

The *elections* held and *political institutions* built, however, marked the partition of Bosnia along an 'inter-entity boundary line'<sup>65</sup>. The most dangerous is that the partition is actually going on the level of national consciousness – the school education of Muslims, Croats and Serbs goes according to different programs; the Croatian and Serbian passports are issued in addition to Bosnian ones<sup>66</sup>. That, of course, impedes implementation of the confidence-building regime, and in future may adversely affect the arms control.

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<sup>64</sup> See S.T. Planken. *Stabilization Force. Operation Joint Guard*. December 6, 1996. [HTTP:// www.cybercomm.nl/~stp/b\\_sfor.html](http://www.cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_sfor.html). Update: 7 September 1997.

<sup>65</sup> See Richard Holbrooke, Backsliding in Bosnia. *Time*, May 20, 1996. P.38.

<sup>66</sup> See Sonia Winter. Bosnia: Senator Biden Declares Lasting Commitment. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Washington, 9 October 1997.

In the *economic sphere* a lot has been done. The SFOR's emphasis was more upon the civilian tasks and deterrence, however the reduction in the force's size meant that fewer engineers and other specialists were available to assist in rebuilding Bosnia's infrastructure.

The attempts to *resettle refugees* failed despite economic sanctions imposed on the parties to facilitate this process. A wave of killings targeting Croats in Bosnia has recently again aggravated tensions in the country's Moslem-Croat Federation and jeopardized plans for refugees to return to their homes.<sup>67</sup>

The SFOR's attempt to adopt a more aggressive stance toward *indicted war criminals* almost blew up the relative peace in Bosnia, and exacerbated Serb suspicions about peacekeepers' impartiality. The danger of "mission creep" was revealed clearly on 10 July, 1997 when in Bosnia-Herzegovina SFOR arrested one Serb indicted for war crimes and killed another one in a fire fight. It led to mass protests of the Bosnian Serbs. The president of Republika Srpska Plavsic rejected the SFOR action because it might deteriorate the current situation in Republika Srpska. Russian authorities also rejected the action and said that might reconsider their contribution to SFOR.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Tensions High After Murders of Bosnian Croats. *Reuters*. October 29, 1997. [HTTP:// www2.infoseek.com/Content?arn= a0474LBY660reulb-19971029&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486](http://www2.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0474LBY660reulb-19971029&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486)

<sup>68</sup> S.T. Planken. *Chronology of Key Events. Part III: SFOR.(August 1, 1997 - present)*. [HTTP: //www.cybercomm.nl/~stp/b\\_chronology\\_sfor\\_b.html](http://www.cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_chronology_sfor_b.html)

According to some views, there is no legal requirement for NATO to actively pursue indicated war criminals. Moreover, military action in Bosnia similar to that initiated in Somalia could destabilize the entire peace process.<sup>69</sup>

However, other Balkan analysts say the SFOR must turn to a more aggressive stance that requires the removal from power of indicted war criminal and wartime Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who continues to wield covert power in Bosnian Serb territory.<sup>70</sup>

The duration of SFOR and its acceptable End State, as some analysts say, should be conditions-dependent. Civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, on which sustained peace depends, will take far longer than SFOR's own mission. Therefore a continued military presence will be required in order to maintain the security essential to civilian implementation. As a minimum, the conditions for withdrawal should be a state of reduced tensions that allows for hand-over to a traditional peacekeeping force or observers, perhaps under the UN or OSCE.<sup>71</sup> However, to date this state has not been achieved yet. According to Samuel Berger, situation in Bosnia now is a slow-boiling crisis that can easily disintegrate without intensive and continuing international intervention.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> See F.M.Lorenz. War Criminals - Testing the Limits of Military Force. *Joint Forces Quarterly*. Summer 1997, pp. 59-65.

<sup>70</sup> Dan De Luce. NATO Toughens Stance on Bosnia Peacekeeping. *Reuters*, October 30, 1997. [HTTP://www2.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0474LBY516reulb-19971030&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486](http://www2.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0474LBY516reulb-19971030&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486).

<sup>71</sup> Charles Barry. After IFOR: Maintaining a Fragile Peace in the Balkans. *Strategic Forum*, Number 62, February 1996. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies.

<sup>72</sup> Clifford Krauss. Stay in Bosnia likely to be extended. Adviser paves way for longer peacekeeping mission, but Clinton decision still pending. *New York Times*. September 24, 1997.



### 3. The Implications of SFOR's Early Withdrawal

*Dayton agreements and "realistic course".* If SFOR withdraws before conditions for a lasting political settlement are established, three general outcomes are possible: *peaceful resolution* ("A unified country"), *limited violence* ("Partition"), and *a return to war*. Only a peaceful resolution is in the interests of international community as well as of Russia or US, but it is the least likely result now. At the heart of the debate on Bosnia now is disagreement over whether the goal of a unified, multiethnic Bosnia that was established by the Dayton peace agreement is realistic. Increasingly, voices in Congress, in U.S. foreign policy circles and of some analysts have been arguing that a de facto partition of Bosnia among its rival factions is inevitable and the most realistic course.<sup>73</sup>

However, according to Richard Holbrooke, the partition of Bosnia along an "inter-entity boundary line" that resembles other divided lands - Korea and Cyprus, is not an acceptable option.<sup>74</sup> It is the most dangerous trend now because it will increase the chances of war and destabilize the entire area of southeastern Europe. "Changing the Dayton Accords to impose partition would be immoral and a terrible thing to do. It would

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<sup>73</sup> John F. Harris. Berger: U.S. Must Stay Involved in Bosnia. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, speaking at Georgetown University in Washington, said Bosnia's recovery from a civil war has been "painfully slow." *Washington Post*. Sept. 24, 1997; P. A27; Optimistic NATO Keeps Troop Pullout Plan. Western Experts See Slim Chance For Bosnian Unity. *Defense News*. August 19, 1996 / August 25, 1996. P. 8.

<sup>74</sup> Richard Holbrooke, Backsliding in Bosnia. *Time*, May 20, 1996. P.38.

probably result in a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia and a landlocked rump ministate around Sarajevo and Tuzla for the Muslims", Holbrooke said.<sup>75</sup>

*Partition - the way to war.* If the international military presence is pulled out of Bosnia now and prevailing conditions are not sustained, it seems that among three scenarios ( "*A unified country*"; "*Partition*"; and "*A return to war*"), the most realistic is the second one (Partition) that may represent little more than an operational pause before the factions resume fighting. An increasing number of politicians and editorialists are now prepared to accept the partition of Bosnia, even though that would represent the defeat of the Dayton Accords. However, as US President National Security Adviser Samuel Berger has recently warned, if the Dayton accords collapse and the Serbs, Muslims and Croats revert to war, it would 'potentially lead to a wider war in southeastern Europe.'<sup>76</sup>

*The need for military presence.* These conclusions argue for a continued outside military presence to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Bosnia can survive only if it has peaceful conditions to create institutions capable of containing ethnic struggles that once led to war. No institution is more important to the peace than the Bosnian Federation, which is supposed to govern the 51 percent of the country under control of the Muslims and Croats. The Dayton peace agreement assumes the existence of

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<sup>75</sup> Sonia Winter. Bosnia: Senator Biden Declares Lasting Commitment. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Washington, 9 October 1997.

<sup>76</sup> Clifford Krauss. Stay in Bosnia likely to be extended. Adviser paves way for longer peacekeeping mission, but Clinton decision still pending. *New York Times*. September 24, 1997.

a solid Federation, which will combine with a Serb Republic to constitute a new Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation is an essential building block, without which it is difficult to expect Dayton to succeed over the long term.<sup>77</sup> At the same time, even more attention should be paid to confidence-building measures between the Federation and Republika Srpska. One of the critical conditions here is full impartiality of SFOR.

At the same time, to avoid a protracted fate in Bosnia, NATO must develop a realistic exit strategy, and then refine it as events unfold. That could mean a follow-on enforcement role as a bridge to traditional peacekeeping, and, ultimately, to independent self-governance. One of the possible exit strategies might be a gradual shrinking of NATO-led operation and increasing of Europe's share in Bosnian peacekeeping.<sup>78</sup> However, that will mean the reducing of the US brokering role on the Balkans and their partition along European geopolitical faultlines.

Anyway, if momentum can be maintained toward peace, NATO should be able to turn its mission over to a traditional UN-style peacekeeping force in one to two years. A worthwhile objective would be to organize, fund and administer such a force, if not under the UN which has become overstretched, then under the OSCE. This scenario seems more

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<sup>77</sup> See Daniel Serwer. Bosnia: Peace by Piece. *Strategic Forum*, Number 81, July 1996. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. [HTTP://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/strforum/forum81.html](http://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/strforum/forum81.html)

<sup>78</sup> See Bigger Role For Europe in Next Bosnia Force--Ruehe. *Reuters*. October 29, 1997. [HTTP://www2.infoseek.co/Content?arn=a1555LBY988reulb-19971029&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486](http://www2.infoseek.co/Content?arn=a1555LBY988reulb-19971029&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&col=NX&kt=A&ak=news1486); John Hillen. After SFOR - Planning a European-Led Force. *Joint Forces Quaterly*. Spring 1997, pp. 75-78.

viable than any other and more peaceful than equipping and training the Muslim-Croat Federation military forces as opposed to the Bosnian Serb army.<sup>79</sup>

There is also another aspect in continuing military presence. It is absolutely true that early withdrawal of peacekeepers from Bosnia may do a significant damage to evolving NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations, for Russian participation in IFOR has global implications. The other critical issue is the growing trust being built between NATO, the United States, and Russia after 50 years of intense confrontation. That trust might be affected by the early withdrawal from Bosnia and a subsequent collapse of the Dayton Accords.<sup>80</sup>

### ***B. RUSSIA-US COOPERATION IN BOSNIA: TWO VIEWS ON FUTURE JOINT PEACE OPERATIONS***

*American view.* The success of combined US-Russian operations in the Implementation Force's (IFOR's) Task Force (TF) Eagle has shattered any misconception that American and Russian soldiers, who faced each other as opponents for so long, could

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<sup>79</sup> The issue of equipping and training of Federation forces is outside of the Dayton Agreement. As Reuters has recently reported, "The United States believes arms control agreements alone cannot achieve a military balance; and that Federation forces will need additional arms and training to establish parity and provide for self-defense. To this end, the United States may pledge \$100 million in military equipment. Although not IFOR's mission, establishing a military balance has become a task to be completed before external forces can be withdrawn. European countries have refused to contribute funds to the program, and say it merely increases the risk of war between the federation and the country's Serb entity . Only the United States and Islamic states have donated funds and weaponry to the Federation military." - See "U.S. Clears Delivery of Tanks for Bosnian Army." *Reuters*. October 23, 1997.

<sup>80</sup> William T. Johnsen. *U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. June 20, 1996, p. 19. [HTTP://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs96/ifor/ifor.wp5](http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs96/ifor/ifor.wp5)



not work side-by-side in the cause of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR/SFOR have proved that NATO and Russia are able to act together in the interest of European security. It is well recognized that throughout the IFOR deployment, relations with Russian forces have been excellent.<sup>81</sup> It has made American military optimistic about the potential for joint peacekeeping with their Russian counterparts.<sup>82</sup>

*Russian view.* However, not everyone on the Russian side is so optimistic on this point. Some Russian analysts argue that when IFOR had been planned Russian foreign policy was dictated not so much by Russia's national interests, but only by then Foreign Minister Andrey Kozirev's political preferences that made him 'follow blindly after the US policy.' That led to mutual disappointments between Russia and US and may cause unwillingness of Moscow to compromise with Washington in the future on the issues where normally there would be no problems.<sup>83</sup>

Russian analysts recognize that it was NATO military intervention conducted under the US pressure and leadership that opened a real prospect to peaceful settlement in

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<sup>81</sup> See, for example, General George A. Joulwan (SACEUR), "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996, p. C3; Ruth Walker, "US and Russian Soldiers Salute 'Trench Peacefare,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 1996, p. 1; and Tim Weiner, "Out of the Cold: U.S. and Russian Spies Share Cloaks in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, January 19, 1996, p. 9.

<sup>82</sup> Jack Hoschouer. NATO Commander Cites Hurdles to Brigade With Russia. *Defense News*. March 24, 1997 / March 30, 1997. P. 10; Charles J. McLaughlin. US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace. *Military Review*, July-August 1997, No. 4, pp. 129-131.

<sup>83</sup> Aleksey Pushkov, The Time of Voluntary Dependency on West Has Gone. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 16 November, 1995, pp. 1, 5.



Bosnia.<sup>84</sup> At the same time it is also recognized that Russia has been actually ousted from the Balkans, where Russia's interests have always had at least two dimensions:

1. Geostrategical dimension. The Balkans being the part of Black Sea - Mediterranean basin have always been the most important component of Russia's southern line of communication, which provides one of the most important ways to the world commercial traffic lines.

2. Geopolitical dimension. The Balkans are a key part of a joint geopolitical zone, including Asia Minor, Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which constitutes the zone of Russia's vital interests.

One of the examples how the Russian establishment views the prospects of the Bosnian experience is the opinion expressed by Yuri Baturin, Secretary of the Defense Council of Russian Federation.<sup>85</sup> According to his view, peace operation in Bosnia is more an exception than a rule because of the following conditions:

- NATO in Bosnia replaced the UN peacekeeping forces, took the side of Muslim-Croat coalition and used a "double standards" approach to the conflict;
- The cooperation between Russia and NATO in Bosnia has been rather limited and not equal. The operation was prepared without Russia, and Russian leadership will not agree to accept such a passive role in the future;

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<sup>84</sup> Morozov A.N. NATO in the Former Yugoslavia: A Change in the Balkans Geopolitical Face. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. 14 November, 1996, pp.1, 4.

<sup>85</sup> Yuri Baturin Maintains that NATO Bosnian Experience Does Not Fit to Providing European Security. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. 28 November, 1996, pp. 1-2.

- Russia had to agree to the Bosnian peace operation and to participation in it because it was the only way to implement the Dayton Accords and lift the anti-Serb sanctions;

- The peace operation funding is not under the UN control and is made up of the contributions of the participating countries, this threatens the democratic principle of voting and replaces it by the “right of property”.

- The Bosnian solution used a unique model of a state building that included two equal components - Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat Federation. This is a transitional and unstable model that may develop either to a unitarian state or to a partition. That is why this unique model has determined the unique character of the IFOR/SFOR, which mission is to maintain the unity of Bosnia. As soon as it withdraws, Bosnia will most probably dissolve into separate parts.

Baturin concludes that the Bosnian model cannot be used at a broader scale on the European security level. At the same time it is a matter of primary importance to stick to the Dayton Accords as they were concluded, without any “modifications”, “writing offs” and “double standards”. The challenges to Dayton peace process include the problem of Posavina corridor, the unilateral prosecution only of the leaders of Republika Srpska, and uncontrollable return of refugees.

As recent events in Bosnia showed, Russia also wants to be consulted more by NATO on Bosnian peacekeeping operations. A foreign ministry spokesman said on 12 September, 1997, that Russia demanded "additional coordination" with NATO. For

example, Russia objected the presence of the US EC-130E aircraft, sent on 11 September, 1997 to silence Bosnian Serb broadcasts.<sup>86</sup>

These views make it quite clear that the Bosnia-like peace operations may be conducted only under certain conditions.

However, these conditions may be not only a function of certain personalities, political, economical and military variables. These conditions may and should be first and foremost the function of national interests, and, particularly, the function of their interaction and cooperation.

The international commitment to the Bosnian operation is of crucial importance because it promotes not only national interests but also mutual relations. How Bosnia's peace is secured will have significant impact not only on the roles of NATO, WEU, EU, and OSCE, but also U.S.-European relations and NATO's relations with Russia.

### ***SUMMARY***

IFOR/SFOR's achievements to date are significant. Once the parties signed the Dayton accords, the NATO-led implementation force separated the opposing forces, supervised exchanges of territory, enforced the cease fire, demobilized armies and heavy weapons and created a secure environment for political and economic recovery. The stabilization force continues these missions.

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<sup>86</sup> S.T. Planken. *Chronology of Key Events. Part III: SFOR. (August 1, 1997 - present)*. [HTTP: //www. cybercomm.nl/~stp/b\\_chronology\\_sfor\\_b.html](http://www.cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_chronology_sfor_b.html)

The military phase of NATO's intervention was spectacularly successful. But the political phase, enforcing provisions of the Dayton peace accord, has been a dismal failure. The troops enforced a cease-fire but did little to arrest war criminals or help refugees return to their homes.

SFOR recently has become more aggressive in enforcing the Dayton accords, escorting refugees and seizing a few suspects indicted on war crimes charges. However, these actions risk the possibility that SFOR troops will be drawn into full-scale combat.

How should IFOR/SFOR's achievements be explained? First of all, by the unity of purpose displayed by the multinational coalition. Secondly, by IFOR/SFOR's robust, credible military presence, its impartiality, unity of command and use of NATO's tried procedures. Thirdly, by IFOR/SFOR's realistic mission, to which its military means are well tailored. Fourthly, it should be noted that IFOR/SFOR's achievements would have been unthinkable without the dedication and professionalism shown by its commanders and their troops. Finally, Russian-American cooperation has become one of the critical factors of the operation's success. It has also shown new prospects and opportunities for joint military cooperation in the future.

The current conditions in Bosnia still require a substantial military presence with a primary goal to prevent the partition of Bosnia. The adopted strategy of force shrinking and reverting to some kind of UN or OSCE-led peacekeeping operation looks reasonable and viable. However, it is hardly possible to predict now the longevity of the operation and the terms of its transition to a traditional peacekeeping mission.

## VI. UNPROFOR AND IFOR/SFOR: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter deals with the major lessons learnt from the management of the Yugoslav crisis and conflict. The analysis of these lessons, in addition to the previously analyzed sources, includes also some views of analysts both prior to and after the NATO intervention to Bosnia.<sup>87</sup> This analysis provides a good basis for comparison of UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR's influential factors, which determined the fall and rise of peacekeepers in that country.

### A. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

#### 1. *The causes of UNPROFOR failure are as follows.*

UNPROFOR tried to respond to cataclysmic unfolding events to which peace plans had been ad hoc and ineffective responses. In Bosnia, let alone the rest of former

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<sup>87</sup> Covault, Marvin. Will NATO succeed in Bosnia? *CNN*. December 13, 1995. [HTTP://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/mission\\_peace/analysis/9512/12-13/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/mission_peace/analysis/9512/12-13/index.html); Johnsen, William T. *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. November 7, 1995; Chris Hedges. NATO Drafts Plan to Extend Its Mission in Bosnia by Two Years. *The New York Times*. September 11, 1996. P. A 7; Friedman, Thomas L.. Voices of Experience. *The New York Times*. December 20, 1995. P. A 21; The UN in Bosnia: A Lesson in Limits. *The New York Times*. December 20, 1995. P. A 1; Friedman, Thomas L. Think Haiti. *The New York Times*. December 3, 1995. P. A15; Anthony Lewis. Lessons Of Disaster. *The New York Times*. July 17, 1995. P. A13; William Shawcross. Prescriptions for Peace. *The New York Times*. February 9, 1997. P. A24; Eric Schmitt. Pentagon Confident, but Some Serbs 'Will Fight': Military Now Says Bosnia Peace Plan Will Work. *The New York Times*. November 27, 1995. P. A1; Adams, James. Bill shouts and swears and shows his fatal weakness. *Sunday Times*. May 29, 1994; William Shawcross. Cambodia peacemaker faces tougher Balkan test. *The Times*. February 18, 1994.



Yugoslavia, there were a great number of factions with no identity of interest. At the same time in Yugoslavia, there was no such unifying, over-arching figure as Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia, that was a court of last resort to whom all the parties turned.

The new states within the former Yugoslavia were recognized while their governments were not in control of the territory they claimed. Under this condition the recognition should have been delayed and concessions to the opposing side encouraged -- or peacekeepers should have been ready to go in and fight for the new regimes.

As it was, UNPROFOR had to 'face the music' of the warring ambitions of Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Albanians, Greeks and others, while possessing a limited and impractical mandate and inadequate resources, and while operating in several countries.

2. *There was a general consensus of all powers* that active measures must have been taken to stop hostilities in Bosnia because they jeopardized regional and international peace and security. Avoiding deeper involvement held greater risks: a wider conflict, expansion into Central Europe, strains within NATO, tensions in U.S.-Russian relations, decrease in public support of the Administration and accusations of "unprincipled behavior". That consensus had determined the strong political will and unity of actions as well as readiness to share risks of intervention.

3. Decision on intervention that involved multinational forces including Russian contingent was achieved due to *a specific combination of national interests in Central and Eastern Europe*. First, Russia had to give up some of its historically formed principles of special relations with the Serbs. Second, all the regional "players" agreed to admit the

US role as a an honest (or at least as the most honest) broker and counterbalancer in international disarray bound with polarized political vectors.

4. Due to employment of *effective mixed strategy* there had formed certain conditions that provided for the operation's success:

- The appeal of the official Bosnian government for the IFOR deployment;
- The will of warring parties to compromise. By the end of 1995 there had been clear signs of the increasing war weariness and stalemate. 'Ethnic cleansings' had also succeeded in redistributing the population in large, more sustainable and continuous enclaves. This had resulted in a serious cease fire and a peace plan agreed to by all the combatants. The factions had consented to NATO troops, including Americans and Russians, to enforce it. President Clinton insisted on letters from Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian leaders promising to insure the safety of American and other troops.

- The UN and NATO forces had taken sides in the conflict and put pressure on the stronger party (first the Serbs and then Muslims) to give way. Historical experience once again proved that neutrality was not required for success, and UN military operations could most often be successful when they did favor one side in dispute.

5. *Clear and militarily reasonable conditions were created for troop deployment:*

- Political leaders gave the military a clear mission statement - a tightly circumscribed set of goals and achievable tasks to be performed with minimum casualties in relatively short terms - in a year;
- Sufficient forces were made available;

- There was a clear military chain of command that did not contain dual key provision;

- Clear exit strategy was defined (although later revised).

6. *Peacekeepers cannot do their job if there is no peace to keep. However, urgent intervention is sometimes necessary at the very height of conflict, if only to keep the violence from raging out of control.* If there is a decision to intervene, it must be well prepared. To think that peacekeepers can just separate warring factions and not get drawn into their human problems is an illusion. POs must address the problems underlying the conflict, otherwise operational success will remain temporary. At the same time, there is a fragile balance between “helping them” and “not letting them think you are going to solve all their problems for them”. With enough troops and money peacekeepers can make some difference for the better. But even that limited improvement is easily eroded, or overwhelmed by the habits of generations, unless some foreign peacekeepers, international organizations, and aid workers are prepared to stay on the job for a long, long time.

7. *Public support is crucial for a successful intervention.* An official commitment to help enforce a peace settlement is not enough. Prior to intervention in Bosnia the US top officials acknowledged that the Administration lacked public support to do so.<sup>88</sup> However, NATO was proactive in dealing with this issue. Part of the solution was a psychologically effective use of radio, TV, and written media to explain NATO's role,

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<sup>88</sup> Eric Schmitt. A Tough Sell: Sending GIs to Bosnia. *The New York Times*. March 10, 1994. P. A12.

what NATO expected from the populace, what the goals were, etc. This effort was a considerable contribution to preparing the way for main body forces.

8. *It is easier to prevent conflict than to stop it.* Early warning measures are essential to this end. Preventive diplomacy should be employed when ever possible, and aimed not only at reconciliation or cessation of hostilities. It should also address the deep roots and causes underlying conflict. Meanwhile, action outside the UN framework to harmonize national interests and exert certain pressure on conflict parties is crucial to success. Preemptive UN force deployment is quite viable, like in Macedonia, where it helped prevent the Balkan wars from spreading.

#### ***B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNPROFOR AND IFOR/SFOR***

The overall comparison of factors that influenced UNPROFOR's and IFOR/SFOR's course is given in Table 3.

**Table 3. A Comparison of the Influential Factors in UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR**

<b>Factors</b>	<b>UNPROFOR</b>	<b>IFOR/SFOR</b>
<b>International community's unity of efforts</b>	A weak and divided international response to conflict led to an ambiguous and contradictory Mandate	Resolute joint efforts of world community led to a clear Mandate
<b>National interests</b>	Political disagreement between the UN major member states. No will to compromise on the national interests.	General consensus of all powers that active measures must be taken. Will to compromise even at the account of some principles.
<b>Preventive diplomacy</b>	None. It was more "provocative" than preventive diplomacy that "pushed the conflict around" rather than found the ways for settlement.	Effective mixed strategy was employed
<b>Mission planning</b>	Unprepared "cascading" deployments of UN forces, dual key in the military chain of command, lack of a clear exit strategy, insufficient forces. <sup>89</sup>	Well-prepared deployment, clear mission statement, clear military chain of command, clear exit strategy, sufficient forces made available.
<b>Action outside the UN framework</b>	Was selective and not persistent. Croatian and Bosnian governments were pressed hard to stop the Croat-Muslim fighting in central Bosnia, but there were never such a pressure on these parties with regard to the Serbs.	Was overall and persistent. All the warring factions were brought to negotiations, pressed hard equally and made to sign Dayton agree-ments.
<b>Consent of the parties to conflict</b>	First phase: Peacekeeping force was deployed to support partial cease-fire. Initially the UN forces tried to keep impartiality and neutrality against the manipulation by all local belligerents. Second phase: The UN decided to take sides, however, without a sufficiently robust force and ROE.	The stronger party was pressed (NATO air strikes against the Serbs), and more robust force with different ROE was deployed to implement full cessation of hostilities.

<sup>89</sup> The problem of sufficient/insufficient forces for peace operations is very complex and conditions-dependent. Anyway, a well-planned mission normally uses as many troops as needed to keep peace, otherwise thousands and thousands of troops might be insufficient for an operation lacking sober and accurate calculations. That was the case with UNPROFOR that was planned really badly.



<b>Factors</b>	<b>UNPROFOR</b>	<b>IFOR/SFOR</b>
<b>Solving the problems underlying the conflict</b>	The Mandate and peace plans did not address the critical problem - who ruled the Serb communities in Bosnia and Croatia.	IFOR stepped in when the "ethnic cleansings" had already brutally solved the critical problem of power and inter-entity boundary lines established. The task of SFOR now is to bring the entities together.
<b>Local conditions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.</li> <li>• The height of the civil war with strong warring ambitions of the factions and only partial cease-fires.</li> <li>• Local consent to the UN's presence with peace-keeping functions only.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The will of warring parties to compromise because of the war weariness and general stalemate in the conflict.</li> <li>• Their readiness to switch over from the causes of conflict to its outcome and recognize the status-quo.</li> <li>• Local consent to NATO troops with enforcement task and capabilities.</li> </ul>
<b>Impartiality and neutrality</b>	UNPROFOR was expected to be fully impartial and neutral. However, it had to take side of the weaker party - Muslims in Bosnia. At the same time, it was not so persistent in taking side of another weaker party - Serbs in Croatia.	IFOR was expected not much as an impartial, but as a neutral force authorized to enforce concluded agreements. This helped deter the FWF from both attacking each other and IFOR troops.
<b>Public support</b>	It was a full public support of UNPROFOR although a resentment about its ability to keep peace and prevent atrocities was gradually growing.	Public opinion was extremely agitated by the images of war in the former Yugoslavia, fully supported IFOR, and was ready to take the risk of casualties.



## VII. CONCLUSIONS

Past experience shows that if a peacekeeping operation could create conditions of stability and trust to facilitate eventual settlement it was normally regarded a success. Another crucial condition for success was the action outside the UN framework that made a permanent settlement possible when the superpowers, through unilateral means, put pressure on the stronger party to give way. Neutrality was not required for success. Moreover, UN military operations were most often successful when they did favor one side in dispute.

However, this does not mean that these features may be extrapolated to all situations. The post-Cold War era is characterized by a proliferation of low level intra-state conflicts. At the same time, it enjoys a number of new advantages. First of all there is a stronger consensus in the UN that has permitted new tasks and methods in peacekeeping. The world community should not lose this opportunity that enhances its capabilities in PO's missions - more explicit and firmly stated mandates beyond the recognized limitations of peacekeeping as traditionally understood.

We believe that all the hypotheses proposed in front of this thesis may be considered tested against the case of peace operation in Bosnia and confirmed in general. However, we also understand that there cannot be a universal solution and not all the elements of our hypotheses might fit the whole array of conflict situations.

**The peace operations in Bosnia have given several major lessons.**

First, a sober calculation of costs and benefits is needed prior to any UN intervention. *It concerns primarily the consensus of national interests, the will of warring parties to seek peaceful solutions, and the UN member states' ability to provide sufficient resources.*

Second, the international community should not wait until a conflict 'burns out'. *The UN must respond to world emergencies, otherwise it will have to be replaced by something else.*

Third, the concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but rigid form of the traditional prototype should undergo certain changes to adapt to the new conditions. Peacekeeping operations are only one small part of the overall Peace Operations Continuum. There needs to be post-conflict peace building to include government rebuilding, humanitarian assistance, economic restructuring, basic infrastructure rebuilding and ongoing diplomatic relations to ensure the peace process stays on track, to name only a few. Peacekeeping is only one part of the entire process, granted a very important one, that ensures a stable secure environment for the rest of the process to develop. *Figuratively speaking, all peace operations must be a kind of a surgery in the whole therapy continuum. It must be like the last stroke of a surgeon, but after a good anesthesia that reduces the pain for a patient - it is very important.*

Fourth, it does not seem the best solution to discard the UN peacekeepers and use only ad hoc regional coalitions with an international mandate. *This may lead to a partition*


*of the world into zones of influence, and produce a rivalry between regional coalitions with unpredictable implications for world peace and security.*

In general, there may be three overlapping echelons of the international community's response to crises and conflicts:

1. The UN's missions;
2. Regional organizations' missions
3. A unilateral response of a certain state or a group of states.

A graphical representation of this model is given below.


**Chart 5. A Three Echelonned Response to Conflict**



The elements of chart 5 might link together in different combinations depending on certain conditions.




**Chart 6. A Multilateral Simultaneous Response To Conflict**




In this case the UN, regional organizations and separate states might use joint efforts to settle a conflict.

**Chart 7. Ad hoc Regional Coalitions Response to Conflict**



Here, the UN might authorize a mission given to an ad hoc coalition and search for support of the state or a group of states in the neighborhood of the conflict.

**Chart 8. A Separate State's (Group of States') Unilateral Response to Conflict**



In this case the UN and regional organizations might authorize and give support to a separate state or a group of states, normally in the neighborhood of a conflict, to manage and resolve it.

In general, the international community's way of response is conditions-dependent, and might start from the relative UN impartiality through regional or even separate state's partisanship in conflict. The same might be with force strength and ROE: from lightly armed force with self-defense ROE through more robust force, mandate and ROE. A

large variety of peace operations might be available: from peacekeeping through peace enforcement.

As analysis shows, peace enforcement to be initiated with an acceptable degree of calculated risk, must embrace the following preconditions:

1. *Conflict constitutes a real danger to global or regional security, and threatens vital interests of regional or global powers.*
2. *It is connected with massive violations of human rights.*
3. *One or more parties do not want to comply with UN's and regional organizations' resolutions.*
4. *Prior to enforcement a mixed strategy is employed to deter warring parties from the spreading of hostilities.*
5. *All parties accept the current Peace Force, and consequently the contribution to Force from certain countries.*
6. *War weariness and military stalemate of conflict prevail, and make the parties to search for peace solution.*
7. *Peace enforcement is undertaken with the consent of the government(s) of the state(s) in which a conflict occurs.*

This model is an "ideal case" that provides necessary requirements for urgent use of military force, although in practice the decisions may be ruled by other considerations<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>90</sup> As Lawrence Freedman notes, "In practice, as Bosnia demonstrated, the key questions would revolve more around the permission of circumstances than their requirements". - Freedman L. Introduction. In: *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*. Freedman L. ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, p.2.

Troops conducting such actions to maintain the order can use arms, for example, against armed groups.

To achieve a success in conflict settlement all the sides in a conflict situation, including those influential parties staying outside, should comply at least with following conditions through all the stages of a conflict:

- An active search for and will to compromise on some principles and national interests.
- The UN's impartiality and neutrality.
- Diplomatic efforts focus first on attempts to achieve the consent of warring parties to compromise on some realistic grounds; second, diplomats try to persuade parties of possibility to switch over from causes of conflict to its outcome; third, the consent on peace force deployment is required.
- The use of force, including air strikes, must be limited to the cases in which they are absolutely necessary, must be proportionate, strong and effective, and correlate with the other elements of a mixed strategy.
- Warring parties should be notified that if they reject the UN's involvement, they will have to face regional organization's or even separate states' more robust and less impartial intervention.

Thus, a working model of international community's conflict management might be as follows.



**Table 4. A Working Model of Conflict Management**

Stages of crisis/conflict	Levels of violence	International response
Peace through crisis	Low political through high political tension	The UN SC makes an assessment, conducts preventive diplomacy and authorizes a preventive UN deployment.
Crisis through war	Low level conflict	The UN conducts (authorizes) humanitarian intervention. Diplomatic efforts are made both by the UN and outside the UN framework to stop a conflict, negotiate a full cease-fire and deploy the UN troops to monitor it.
War through cease-fire	Intense conflict	If the UN peacekeeping force is in, a mixed strategy is employed involving partial use of a regional organization's or a separate state's (states') military capabilities to make warring parties to stop hostilities and begin negotiations. Humanitarian operations are continued. If the UN is still out, diplomatic efforts are made to negotiate a full cease-fire and deploy the UN troops to monitor it. The military capabilities of regional organizations or separate state (states) may be involved to implement cease-fire agreements. The factors of war weariness and conflict stalemate are used. If the UN is denied, humanitarian operations are stopped, and peace enforcement operation is authorized and conducted by a regional organization or a separate state (states).
Cease-fire through cessation of hostilities	High political tensions through low political tensions	If the UN is in, it monitors cease-fires and arbitrates post conflict peace building. Humanitarian relief is resumed. If the UN is out, a regional organization or a separate state conducts all necessary measures to implement agreements. As situation improves, regional troops gradually turn over their responsibilities to the UN force or some regional political security arrangements.
Peace	Low political tensions through no tensions	The UN or political security organization gradually shrinks its mission to observers through no foreign representatives. Humanitarian relief also shrinks as local economy starts to function normally. Conflict is settled.

According to this model the situation in Bosnia now could be assessed as "a low-level conflict with a clear threat of back-sliding to war". A robust preventive deployment

is needed to keep peace, and heavy humanitarian assistance is required to build confidence. Economic sanctions can only worsen the situation and should be avoided. The primary emphasis should be on confidence-building measures and prevention of Bosnia's partition than on efforts to train and equip Bosnian factions.

In retrospect, one of the major lessons is that it was not the best and easiest way the peace was brought about to the former Yugoslavia. It would have been much better, if Germany could have compromised on its national interests, and had not recognized Slovenia and Croatia right after their declarations of independence. Russia could have put more effective pressure on the Serbs, if there had been an adequate pressure upon the Croats and Muslims.

Peace operations normally are a definite function of national interests and may be successful if there is an overlap in national objectives of different "players". However, they also may be successful, if there is a mutual desire of the "players", or at least a unilateral desire of one of the major "players" to "swallow the principles" for the sake of peace. In other words, a compromise is always required for peacekeeping success, and the more it is mutual, the better.

It is a clear exaggeration that Russia has given up its national interests in the Yugoslav conflict. Russia's participation, from the very beginning of UNPROFOR until now, has always been very important factor that influenced the situation not only in Bosnia but also elsewhere in the Balkans. And it was not the interests, but some principles that were eventually "swallowed". By contributing its troops to IFOR/SFOR Russia has

managed to secure its traditional ties with the Serbs, and to a certain extent preserved its influence in the Balkans, as a whole.

However, it was not so easy for the Russian establishment and public opinion to compromise on the Balkans issues, and there is still a strong belief that then compromise was more at the account of the Russian than the US interests. This fact should be considered in the future, while Russia and the US will be working on the issues requiring mutual concessions.

Close cooperation between the Russian and US politicians and military seems to be one of the crucial preconditions of success in Bosnia. In any case, Russia's participation in the peace operations in Bosnia is an important factor and must be continued because it promotes its national interests, and facilitates Russia-US and Russia-NATO cooperation.

Of course, there is still much to be done to make such a cooperation the rule rather than the exception. In any case, the POs in Bosnia have demonstrated the international community's new capabilities in conflict management. The Bosnian experience has once again proved a banality: problems may be solved if there is a will on both sides to compromise. And where there is a will, there is a way.



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